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Predicting Alarm And Safety System Performance Using Simulation
Abstract
Safety is paramount to the chemical process industries. Because many processes operate at high
temperatures and/or pressures, involving hazardous chemicals at high concentrations, the potential for
accidents involving adverse human health and/or environmental impacts is significant. Thanks to
research and operational efforts, both academically and industrially, the occurrences of such incidents
are rare. However, disastrous events in the chemical manufacturing industry are still of relevant concern
and garner further attention – the Deepwater Horizon incident (2010) and the Texas City refinery
explosion (2005) being two recent examples.
Many techniques have been developed to understand, quantify, and predict alarm and safety system
failures. In practice, hazards are identified using Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and a network
of independently-acting safety systems works to maintain the probabilities of such events below a Safety
Integrity Level (SIL). The network of safety systems is studied with Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA),
which uses failure probability estimates for individual subsystems to project the failures of entire safety
system networks.
With few alarm and safety system activations over the lifetime of a chemical process, particularly the
critical last-line-of-defense systems, the failure probabilities of these systems are difficult to estimate.
Statistical techniques have been developed, attempting to decrease the variances of such predictions
despite few supporting data. This thesis develops methods to estimate the failure probabilities of rarely
activated alarm and safety systems using process and operator models, enhanced by process, alarm, and
operator data. Two repeated simulation techniques are explored involving informed prior distributions and
transition path sampling. Both use dynamic process models, based upon first-principles, along with
process, alarm, and operator data, to better understand and quantify the probability of alarm and safety
system failures and the special-cause events leading to those failures.
In the informed prior distribution technique, process and alarm data are analyzed to extract information
regarding operator behavior, which is used to develop models for repeated simulation. With alarm and
safety system failure probabilities estimated for specific special-cause events, near-miss alarm data are
used, in real-time, to enhance the predictions.
The transition path sampling method was originally developed by the molecular simulation community to
understand better rare molecular events. Herein, important modifications are introduced for application to
understand better how rare safety incidents evolve from rare special-cause events. This method uses
random perturbations to identify likely trajectories leading to system failures – providing a basis for
potential alarm and safety system design.
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ABSTRACT

PREDICTING ALARM AND SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE USING
SIMULATION
Ian H. Moskowitz
Warren D. Seider

Safety is paramount to the chemical process industries. Because many processes
operate at high temperatures and/or pressures, involving hazardous chemicals at high
concentrations, the potential for accidents involving adverse human health and/or
environmental impacts is significant. Thanks to research and operational efforts, both
academically and industrially, the occurrences of such incidents are rare. However,
disastrous events in the chemical manufacturing industry are still of relevant concern and
garner further attention – the Deepwater Horizon incident (2010) and the Texas City
refinery explosion (2005) being two recent examples.
Many techniques have been developed to understand, quantify, and predict alarm
and safety system failures.

In practice, hazards are identified using Hazard and

Operability (HAZOP) analysis, and a network of independently-acting safety systems
works to maintain the probabilities of such events below a Safety Integrity Level (SIL).
The network of safety systems is studied with Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA),
which uses failure probability estimates for individual subsystems to project the failures
of entire safety system networks.
vii

With few alarm and safety system activations over the lifetime of a chemical process,
particularly the critical last-line-of-defense systems, the failure probabilities of these
systems are difficult to estimate. Statistical techniques have been developed, attempting
to decrease the variances of such predictions despite few supporting data. This thesis
develops methods to estimate the failure probabilities of rarely activated alarm and safety
systems using process and operator models, enhanced by process, alarm, and operator
data.

Two repeated simulation techniques are explored involving informed prior

distributions and transition path sampling. Both use dynamic process models, based
upon first-principles, along with process, alarm, and operator data, to better understand
and quantify the probability of alarm and safety system failures and the special-cause
events leading to those failures.
In the informed prior distribution technique, process and alarm data are analyzed to
extract information regarding operator behavior, which is used to develop models for
repeated simulation. With alarm and safety system failure probabilities estimated for
specific special-cause events, near-miss alarm data are used, in real-time, to enhance the
predictions.
The transition path sampling method was originally developed by the molecular
simulation community to understand better rare molecular events. Herein, important
modifications are introduced for application to understand better how rare safety
incidents evolve from rare special-cause events. This method uses random perturbations
to identify likely trajectories leading to system failures – providing a basis for potential
alarm and safety system design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background

Despite much attention and many efforts, accidents in the chemical manufacturing
industries are relevant, costly, and occasionally fatal. In the past four years, over 100
fatalities have occurred in the United States due to a wide variety of accidents (“Worker
Fatalities to Federal and State OSHA”). There have been incidents in the past decade that
have drawn much attention due to their severe nature – BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill
(“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: BP Deepwater Horizon”), Texas City refinery
explosion (“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: BP America Refinery Explosion”), and
the Kleen Energy Systems explosion (“U.S. Chemical Safety Board Report: Kleen
Energy Natural Gas Explosion”), to name a few. Each of these accident scenarios
involves two critical similarities – an unexpected event occurred, and the event was not
handled properly by operators and plant managers (Kletz, 2009).

Because many

chemical plants involve dangerous chemicals, high temperatures, high pressures, or are in
environmentally fragile areas (e.g., the Gulf Coast), the impacts of accidents can be quite
large. The Texas City refinery explosion claimed the lives of 14 workers and injured
over 100 more. The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill devastated the environment along
much of the Gulf Coast, and was one of the most costly accidents ever, having damage
estimates as high as 42 billion dollars. While these events are rare, their impact is
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sufficiently high to warrant further research aimed at predicting, mitigating, and
preventing these accidents.
The typical approach to preventing accidents in a chemical manufacturing process
involves process design coupled with design of operating strategies, process
controlsystems, and safety systems.

Processes can be designed such that they are

inherently less sensitive to disturbances in process units and feedstock fluctuations. This
approach, known as inherently safer design (ISD), often varies process-to-process, with
specific process units or features installed to handle potential accidents before they
develop (Hendershot, 2006).

On the inlet of sensitive reactors, it is common for

designers to introduce buffer tanks to dampen deviations in feed flow rates, compositions,
temperatures, and pressures. Separation units commonly involve extra trays, bed depth,
or membrane areas – permitting continued operation in the face of large disturbances.
Some units are designed to be used only when a problem arises in a plant. In many cases
involving pipes designed for gas flow, a pressure-release line is installed. When the
pressure exceeds an upper bound, gas can be redirected to the release line and flared so
that it doesn’t rupture a pipe. Stop valves are typically installed on the inlet and outlet of
sensitive processing units – allowing operators to isolate problems that occur upstream of
the unit or within the unit. Various indices and statistical approaches for quantifiably
evaluating and rationalizing ISD have been developed (Srinivasan et al., 2012).
Disturbances in a plant occur on a frequent basis, often minute-to-minute, and
need to be handled in an efficient manner. While process design features can help to
dissipate disturbances, they are often not responsible for arresting them. This is the role
of the process control system.

PID controllers are the most basic – a variable is
2

measured, and based on its deviation from its setpoint, the controller typically opens or
closes a valve in part or in full (Luyben, 1989; Stephanopoulos, 1984). Here, the
controller must be tuned properly, and the measuring device and actuator must be
functioning properly. If not, there is potential for the disturbance to propagate further.
Control configurations involving PID controllers have been developed, such as cascade
or feedforward controllers. These provide tighter and/or more robust process control,
assuming that the measuring devices and actuators are working properly.

Model-

predictive controllers use first-principle or empirical models to yield actuator responses
that minimize deviations from set points over the predictive horizon (Garcia et al., 1989).
They often improve controllability, but process-model mismatch may keep controllers
from adequately arresting disturbances.
When the process design features and control systems are insufficientto regulate a
disturbance, the operator, often in response to alarms, is responsible for any corrective
actions to move the process back to typical operating conditions with a safety interlock
system shutting down the process when it deviates sufficiently far from these conditions
(Crowl et al., 2001). Operators typically have the ability to make adjustments to decision
variables in a process, open and close valves, and switch control systems on and off, and
are aided by a network of alarms. When alarms activate to notify operators that process
variables have crossed thresholds, the operators are expected to: (1) diagnose the root
cause of the problem, and (2) make appropriate corrective actions to mitigate the
consequences (Hollifield et al., 2010). This can be a difficult task, particularly when the
root cause problem is shrouded; i.e., the process is undergoing inverse response or there
is an undetected rare event occurring.
3

In addition to the operator, there is an automated safety interlock system. Interlocks work
to shut down the plant automatically when specific process variables, called primary
variables, cross defined thresholds. The automatic safety interlock system is important
because it shuts down the process before safety systems, such as quench tanks or relief
valves, are activated as a last line of defense in preventing the process from entering a
runaway reaction mode where human health and environmental catastrophes are possible.
Plant operator actions are important in the continued operation of a process, and safer
operation is realized when plant operators are effective in preventing processes
from undergoing shutdown (and associated restart) and activating crucial safety
systems.
Alarms are placed on process variables to alert operators that the process is
deviating from its expected regime(s) of operation. A typical alarm has a low-threshold
(for L alarms) and a high-threshold (for H alarms) that bound the range of typical
operation. When the measured variable moves outside these thresholds, an alarm is
activated and a special-cause event has occurred. The L and H-alarm thresholds, along
with more severe alarm thresholds, are established during the commissioning phase of a
process, typically the first one to three years of operation. During the design phase,
several measured variables are chosen as primary variables.

Strong candidates for

primary variables are those that best describe the safety of the process – often, the
measurements associated with the most potentially dangerous operations (i.e., process
units at high temperature or pressure, or containing hazardous chemicals). Ideally, safety
interlocks are activated only when these variables move into unsafe regimes (Rothenberg,
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2009). The choice of alarm thresholds and primary variables has a major impact on the
effectiveness of the operator response to alarms to reliably maintain safe operation.
Areas of unsafe operation are commonly determined using hazard and operability,
HAZOP, analyses (Kletz, 1999). This common and systematic approach is intended to
determine all potential hazards to process units. All potential material inlets (through
designed inlet ports and backflow through outlet ports, as well as leaks through the vessel
walls) are considered, and the potential chemical reactions are postulated. Mechanical
failures to piping and valves and electrical failures to compressors, motors, and control
systems are also considered. HAZOP has long been performed as a qualitative approach,
but computer-based HAZOP approaches and algorithms have been developed, in an
effort to reduce the amount of human error that arises during the hazard identification
procedure (Venkatasubramanian et al., 1994; Palmer et al., 2008). Human error and
“safety culture” has been incorporated into HAZOP approaches, with operator mistakes
and failures studied as potential causes of hazards to process operation (Kennedy et al.,
1998). The qualitative analysis is then enhanced using quantitative statistics – the failure
rates of similar process units are used to gain an understanding of the most severe process
risks. This analysis is often the basis for determining the primary variables in the
process. Process variables associated with the greatest potential hazards or risks are
chosen as primary variables, ensuring that an automatic shutdown is attempted when
these variables are far outside their typical operating regions.
With potential hazards to process operation identified, independently-acting
safety systems are installed to maintain the probability of failure below a pre-specified
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) (Dowell, 1998). The independently-acting safety systems are
5

commonly evaluated using event-trees, where the probability of the network of safety
systems failing is the product of the failure probability of each activated safety system
(Andrews et al., 2000; Phimister et al., 2003). As illustrated using the “Swiss Cheese
Model”, an accident occurs when the various levels of safety systems fail or are
insufficient (Reason, 1990).

Figure 1.1. Swiss cheese model
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), is the industry standard to quantify the accident
probability for specific special-cause events, typically indentified during HAZOP
(Summers, 2003). This quantitative procedure is valuable in characterizing the safety of
a process during a special-cause event.

More recently, techniques to evaluate the

process’s safety through a period of human error have been developed (Baybutt, 2002;
Baybutt, 2003). Various techniques to quantify the failure probability of individual
6

safety systems and the network of safety systems have been developed, all sharing the
challenge of few safety system activations over the lifetime of a process. Bayesian
networks (Marsh et al., 2008) and neural networks (Ruilin et al., 2010) have been utilized
to quantify these failure probabilities.
While LOPA estimates the probability of safety system failure, Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) estimates the probability of special-cause event occurrence. The varying
paths leading to a special-cause event are identified and process statistics are used to
characterize the probability of such an event occurring (Khakzad et al., 2011; Tanaka et
al., 1983). These estimates can be combined with previous event-tree approaches for
analyzing the failure probability of the safety system network during a special-cause
event.

This “bow-tie” approach tracks the special-cause event from its root-cause

through the safety system activation (Cockshott, 2005).
In some cases, alarms are officially considered a layer-of-protection and
contribute to the SIL rating of the overall safety system. Therefore, the alarms are
included in the safety-systems discussed herein – noting that often the full alarm system
is not considered part of a plant’s safety instrumented system (SIS).

The failure

probabilities of specific safety systems, as well as the network as a whole, are often
difficult to estimate – the activation of most safety systems occur infrequently, and
oftentimes the root-cause of the event is poorly understood. If the failure probabilities of
safety systems, could be known with certainty, the probability of accidents at a process
could be guaranteed below the SIL with proper safety system design. Various techniques
and methods for quantifying the failure probabilities of rarely activated safety systems
have been developed, and this thesis explores new techniques in this area.
7

Dynamic Risk Analysis (DRA) is used to update risk estimates over the lifetime
of the plant (Meel et al., 2006; Kalantarnia et al., 2009). As process and alarm data are
collected, in real-time, DRA updates the risk estimations that were made during the
design and commissioning phases. Typically Bayesian statistics (Bayesian analysis) are
used to generate failure probability estimates using alarm data (Pariyani et al., 2012a).
The Bayesian approach has the potential to generate failure probabilities having lower
variance than those achieved using classical statistics, and is explained in Chapter 2.
DRA performs best in describing the risk of frequently activated safety systems – with
more data available, estimates with narrower confidence intervals can be made. For
infrequently used systems, copulas have been introduced to make risk estimates with
smaller variances (Pariyani et al., 2012b; Yi et al., 1998).

Copulas describe the

dependence between the more frequently-activated, low-consequence systems with
infrequently-activated, high-consequence systems.
While dynamic risk analysis and copulas are effective in making meaningful risk
estimates for many infrequently-used systems, data may be too sparse to permit copulas
to reduce the variance of risk estimates sufficiently. Many processes, such as the steammethane reformer studied herein, are well-understood, and special-cause events are
generally handled reliably by plant operators.

This thesis explores model-based

approaches for better understanding the failure probabilities of operator responses to
alarms that rarely lead to safety interlock activations and associated plant shutdowns.
Process models, while not a perfect representation of the process, can be simulated many
times, generating a large pool of simulated alarm and safety interlock activations. These
statistics can then be enhanced with process and alarm data, when available, to improve
8

the failure probability predictions.

Various sampling techniques are developed and

applied to safety systems. In particular, this thesis explores informed prior distributions
and transition path sampling.

These sampling techniques utilize both process and

operator models, enhanced by process and alarm data collected at the plant. Pathways, or
trajectories, to safety interlock activations are explored.

While the safety interlock

activations investigated are inherently rare, the failures have the potential to be
catastrophic in the unlikely event that safety interlock systems fail. At best, the safety
interlock system activations are expensive due to lost product and process shutdowns.
The three chapters describing these techniques are briefly introduced in the next three
sections.

1.2 Chemical Process Simulation for Dynamic Risk Analysis: Developing Informed
Prior Distributions

Chapter 2 describes how dynamic simulations of a manufacturing process can be
used to construct informed prior distributions for the failure probabilities of alarm and
safety interlock systems. Bayesian analysis is used starting with prior distributions and
enhancing them with likelihood distributions, constructed from real-time alarm data, to
form posterior distributions, which are used to estimate failure probabilities. The use of
alarm data to build likelihood distributions has previously been investigated. Rare-event
historical data are typically sparse and have high-variance likelihood distributions. When
high-variance likelihood distributions are combined with typical high-variance prior
9

distributions, the resulting posterior distributions naturally have high variances yielding
unreliable failure predictions. In contrast with prior distributions obtained by maximizing
entropy and those that are based on expert knowledge, this chapter introduces a repeatedsimulation method to construct informed prior distributions having smaller variances,
which in turn yield posterior distributions with lower variances and a more reliable
prediction of the failure probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems.

The

application of the proposed method is demonstrated for the offline dynamic risk analysis
of a steam-methane reformer (SMR) process.

1.3

Improved Predictions of Alarm and Safety System Performance Using

Process and Operator Response-Time Modeling

In Chapter 2, a repeated-simulation process-model-based technique for
constructing informed prior distributions is introduced. The models used in simulation
are crucial to the low-variance risk predictions generated by the sampling technique.
This chapter investigates the effect modeling has on the risk predictions, and how both
process and operator models can be systematically improved to generate more accurate
risk predictions. This chapter presents a method of quantifying process model quality,
which impacts prior and posterior distributions used in Bayesian Analysis. The method
uses higher-frequency alarm and process data to select the most relevant constitutive
equations and assumptions. New data-based probabilistic models that describe important
10

special-cause event occurrences and operators’ response-times are proposed and
validated with industrial plant data. These models can be used to improve the estimates of
failure probabilities for alarm and safety interlock systems.

1.4

Understanding Rare Safety and Reliability Events Using Transition Path

Sampling

There is strong motivation to understand how rare reliability and safety-events
develop and propagate. Effective operator training, safety system design, and safety
analysis, all benefit from a full understanding of such events. A major challenge in the
study of events that propagate to process shutdowns or safety incidents is their sparsity –
typically these events occur so rarely that statistical techniques alone are incapable of
describing and characterizing them – especially when they have not yet occurred.
Simulation of these events could be useful to understand them, however, a daunting
computational challenge exists. Typical rare events occur on the order of years or
decades apart, while the events occur within minutes or hours. Thus, the bulk of the
computational effort in simulating rare events is allocated to normal operation, making
the events computationally infeasible to simulate with meaningful frequencies.
A rare-event sampling technique, Transition Path Sampling (TPS), has been
developed by the molecular dynamics community. While the time and length scales
between molecular dynamics and process dynamics differ greatly, the ratios of the times
of the rare events and the waiting times between them are similar. This Monte-Carlo
11

based technique relies on the simulation of perturbed rare-event trajectories – an initial
rare-event trajectory is randomly modified such that large numbers of trajectories are
generated. Clusters of rare safety-event trajectories are the basis for alarm and safetysystem design, assuring that TPS-generated clusters are preventable.

Important

modifications to the TPS technique are needed to apply it to process dynamics. The
backwards integration, a key attribute of TPS, is not possible for most process
simulations – instead a boundary-value optimization technique is used. Furthermore,
process models use vast amounts of process data for model verification and to estimate
the relative likelihood of one trajectory to another.

The application of TPS is

demonstrated using a simple jacketed exothermic CSTR, as well as a more complex air
separation process. This innovative approach allows for a quantitative rationalization of
alarm and safety systems to reduce the occurrence of rare, yet serious, safety events.
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Chapter 2
Chemical Process Simulation for Dynamic Risk Analysis

2.1.

Introduction

The design of accurate process models and optimal flowsheets have challenged
process systems engineering researchers for decades – often involving optimizations with
decision variables (such as feed-stock or operation variables) adjusted to increase
revenue, decrease cost, or increase profit (Seider et al., 2009).

From a controls

perspective, controller parameters are tuned to improve performance measures (Seborg et
al., 2010). Furthermore, superstructures are used to determine which process units and
controllers should be included for optimal functionality (Yeomans et al., 1999). But,
process models and flowsheets have been under-investigated in the process safety area,
where process engineers are challenged to reduce the risk of incidents, the most serious
of which may be classified as accidents. Process incidents, resulting in human-health
losses, environmental losses, and capital losses, are expensive and occasionally tragic
(when safety systems are insufficient to prevent process incidents from becoming process
accidents) (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Process Safety
Incident Database).
To design and operate a process with reduced incident and accident risk, it is
crucial to quantify the probabilities of incidents. This can be a difficult task, as it
involves: (1) determining the probability of each special-cause event, (2) determining the
13

probability of each consequence arising from each special cause, and (3) evaluating the
severity of each consequence (Pariyani et al., 2010; Mannan et al., 1999). To quantify
accurately the overall risk of an incident, these three tasks are required for every special
cause, consequence, and loss, providing quite a daunting challenge! The success or
failure of an alarm system depends upon the success or failure of operator actions taken
in response to an activated alarm. In contrast, the Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
takes automatic actions such as a shutdown initiated by an interlock. In this paper, the
focus is on simulating the effects of special cause events to inform and improve design
and operation decisions to mitigate incidents. In this manner, process engineers and
operators can make more informed decisions to reduce plant risk (Phimister et al., 2003;
Jones et al., 1999).
Emphasis is placed on constructing sufficiently accurate process simulations to
evaluate plant safety, given measured process and alarm data. Clearly, special attention
is needed: (i) in the most risky plant areas, and (ii) when special-cause events are likely to
be amplified or masked (Rosenthal et al., 2006). The former typically involve high
temperatures, pressures, and hazardous chemicals.

The latter are more difficult to

identify, especially when their responses occur in rapid transients. Masked responses
include inverse responses and delays (dead-times) which may lead operators to take
incorrect action in response to alarms. Here, dynamic, first-principles, process models,
built with knowledge from historical process and alarm data (Chen et al., 1998), can help
operators respond better to these special-causes. While first-principles models have long
been used in the chemical process industries to enhance an understanding of processes
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(Soroush et al., 1992), this paper provides a new method to estimate the failure
probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems.
The rest of this chapter begins with a discussion of typical alarm and safety
interlock systems and their associated event trees and failure probabilities.

Next,

Bayesian analysis is reviewed, followed by the presentation of a new method that uses
dynamic simulations to create informed prior distributions for Bayesian analysis. Then, a
detailed steam-methane reforming (SMR) model integrated with a pressure-swing
adsorption (PSA) model is presented and the proposed method is demonstrated by
simulating the combined model. To our knowledge, no published integrated SMR-PSA
model exists including recycle of the PSA-offgas to the SMR fuel system. Finally,
conclusions are drawn with recommendations for future work.

2.2.

Safety Systems and Event Trees

An abnormal event occurs when a process variable leaves its normal operating
range (green-belt zone in Figure 2.1), which triggers an alarm indicating transition into
the yellow-belt zone. If the variable continues to move away from its normal range, the
variable may transition into its red-belt zone, indicated by a second-level alarm (e.g., LL,
HH) activation. Once a variable remains in its red-belt zone for a pre-specified length of
time (typically on the order of seconds), an interlock activates and an automatic shutdown
occurs (Hosseini et al., 2007).
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Red-Belt Zone
HH-Alarm Threshold

Yellow-Belt Zone
H-Alarm Threshold

Primary
Variable
Value

Green-Belt Zone
L-Alarm Threshold

Yellow-Belt Zone
LL-Alarm Threshold

Red-Belt Zone
Time

Figure 2.1. Belt-zone map for primary variables.

An event-tree corresponding to a primary variable’s transition between belt-zones
is shown in Figure 2.2. The first-level (e.g., L, H) alarm system activates safety-system 1
(SS1), which is typically an operator action. When SS1 is successful, with probability
1-x1, continued operation, consequence C1, is achieved. The second-level (e.g., LL, HH)
alarm system activates SS2, which is typically a more aggressive operator action. When
successful, with probability 1-x2, near-miss continued operation, consequence C2, is
achieved. If the primary variable occupies the red-belt zone for a pre-determined length
of time (on the order of seconds), SS3, the automatic interlock plant shutdown, will
become activated. The interlock system is designed to be independent of alarm systems,
and the activation of SS3 is determined by an independent set of sensors. It should be
noted that if the interlock system is designed to have no delay time, the probability of SS2
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success is equal to zero (x2 = 1). If SS3 succeeds, with probability 1-x3, the interlock
shutdown is successful and an accident is avoided, represented by consequence C3. If the
interlock shutdown is unsuccessful, an accident occurs at the plant, represented by C4.
With proper design, x3 should be very small consistent with the specified Safety Integrity
Level (SIL) (Stavrianidis et al., 1998; Stavrianidis et al., 2000). Since the interlock
system is independent of the alarm system, the success of SS3 will not depend on factors
such as operator skill or alarm sensor fault. However, it can be concluded that if either
SS1 or SS2 are successful in arresting the special-cause event, the activation of the
interlock system can be avoided altogether.

In some cases, alarms are officially

considered a layer-of-protection and contribute to the SIL rating of the overall safety
system, composed of SS1, SS2, and SS3. Therefore, the alarms are included in the safetysystems herein – noting that often the full alarm system is not considered part of a plant’s
SIS.
In this way, event trees represent the actions of various alarm and safety interlock
systems and their end consequences after abnormal events (Meel et al., 2006). For
dynamic risk analyses, alarm and interlock actions must be chronologically tracked and
recorded (using the plant alarm historian).

Using data compaction techniques and

Bayesian analyses, failure probabilities of the alarm and safety interlock systems and the
probabilities of plant incidents (Pariyani et al., 2012a; Pariyani et al., 2012b) have been
estimated.
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Action in
Response
to H/L
Alarm)

SS2
(Operator
Action in
Response
to HH/LL
Alarm)

SS3
(Interlock
Shutdown)

1-x1

C1 (Continued Operation)
1-x2

Abnormal
Event
x1
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1-x3

C3 (Plant Shutdown)

x2
x3

C4 (Plant Accident)

Figure 2.2. Event tree involving three safety systems.

2.3.

Bayesian Analysis

Bayesian analysis is often used to determine the failure probabilities of alarm and
safety interlock systems. The central dogma of Bayesian analysis is that random-variable
distribution parameters (e.g., mean and variance) are themselves distributions. Unlike
classical statistics that seeks to capture the true moments of a distribution, Bayesian
statistics acknowledges that the moments of a distribution may not be fixed, and seeks to
estimate the probability distributions of the moments.

This analysis often requires

significantly fewer data to make meaningful predictions (Gelman et al., 2014; Berger,
2013). Additionally, as the process dynamics and operators’ behavior change with time
(because of factors such as process unit degradation and operators’ improved skills), real-
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time data can be collected and used to estimate more accurate failure probabilities in real
time.
In Bayesian analysis, the posterior distribution, represented as
probability distribution of

given the collected data,

, the

, is calculated using

Bayes’ rule:

(2.1)

where

is the prior distribution of

, estimated before data are collected, and

is the likelihood distribution of the data given

. The prior distribution is

normally estimated using expert knowledge or maximum entropy techniques (Ahooyi et
al., 2014). The likelihood distribution captures the probability that the data could have
been generated, if the failure probability was equal to

, as discussed next.

Herein. a beta distribution is used to represent an informed prior distribution,
which is constructed using process simulations:

(2.2)

where

and

are parameters obtained through simulation, and

function:
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is the gamma

(2.3)

The beta distribution is well suited to represent a safety-system failure-probability
distribution because its domain is [0, 1], and its two parameters can be estimated from
only two moments (e.g., the mean and variance) of simulated data.

The alarm data provides a record of each safety system activation, which can be tracked
to its failure or success. The binary performance lends itself to being described using a
binomial likelihood distribution:

(2.4)

where

represents the alarm data,

is the number of safety system activations, and

is

the number of safety system failures. When Eqs. (2.2) and (2.4) are substituted into Eq.
(2.1), the posterior distribution for

, given

and

is:

(2.5)

This is a beta distribution with parameters
recognizing that
a=

is a function of

and

,

only. Note that for the beta distribution in Eq. (2.2),

and b = . Consequently, using the identity:
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(2.6)

the posterior distribution in Eq. (2.5) simplifies to the beta distribution:

(2.7)

As alarm data are collected in real time, the alarm statistics can be updated in real time
(Meel et al., 2006; Khakzad et al., 2012; Kalantarnia et al., 2009). In so doing, process
engineers gain a better understanding of how the process is performing (Pariyani et al.,
2012b).

2.4.

Constructing Informed Prior Distributions

The proposed method of construction of informed prior distributions has the eight
steps listed in Table 1. In Steps 1-3, a robust, dynamic, first-principles model of the
process incorporating the control, alarm and safety interlock systems, is built. The model
can then be simulated using a simulator such as gPROMS (gPROMS v.3.6.1; Oh, et. al.,
1996), which is used herein. The control system in the model mimics the actual plant
control system, with consistent control logic and tuning. Likewise, the alarm and safety
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interlock systems in the model mimic those in the plant. For operator actions, this can be
difficult, as operators often react differently to alarms. In particular, expert operators
may take into account the state of the entire process when responding to alarms. When
creating a model, the likelihood of operator actions must be considered. Either the
modeler can use the action most commonly taken by operators, or a stochastic simulation
can be set up in which the different actions are assigned probabilities.
With these models, special-cause events are postulated in Step 4. The list of
special-cause events can be developed from various sources: HAZOP or LOPA analysis,
observed accidents in the plant (or a similar plant), near-miss events at the plant (or in a
similar plant), or from risks suggested in first-principles models of the plant. For each
special-cause event, an event magnitude distribution is created in Step 5. A distribution
for operator response time, τ, is created in Step 6. These three distributions are used
along with the dynamic simulation in Step 7 to obtain simulation data. Lastly, in Step 8,
the simulated data is used to regress parameters for the informed prior distribution. The
algorithm used to generate simulation data (Step 7) and regress informed prior
distribution parameters (Step 8) is described in the paragraph below, and represented
pictorially in Figure 2.3.
The script that manages the dynamic simulations starts by sampling A1 from the
event magnitude distribution created in Step 5. Note that Figure 2.3 shows a Normal
distribution centered at µSC with variance σ2SC, however any distribution can be used.
Assign the number of safety system failures, i, to i = 0. With this A1, the user script
samples τ1 from the distributions created in Step 6. Although Figure 2.3 shows Uniform
distributions (with the maximum operator response time at τmax), any distribution can be
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used. With A1 and τ1, a dynamic simulation is run. If the safety system fails to avoid a
plantwide shutdown, then i = i + 1; if the safety system is successful, i is not incremented.
When n < N, n = n + 1; i.e., for sampled Ai and τi, a dynamic simulation is run, and i is
adjusted when necessary. After N iterations, j1 = i/N is calculated, in the range [0,1].
Then m is incremented and Am sampled, the inner loop is re-executed, and jm is calculated.
When the outer loop has been completed (m = M), a vector of M elements (j1, ..., jM) has
been accumulated. The average and variance of this vector is used to calculate

and

of

the Beta distribution. Note that because the Beta distribution is the conjugate prior of the
binomial likelihood distribution, it is the recommended choice.

The number of

simulations, M×N, is chosen, recognizing that more simulations yield a smaller priordistribution variance.

Table 2.1. Steps to Construct an Informed Prior Distribution
1.

Develop a dynamic first-principles process model

2.

Incorporate control system into the dynamic process model

3.

Incorporate the alarm and safety interlock system into the dynamic process

model
4.

Postulate potential special-cause events to be studied

5.

For each special-cause event, construct a distribution for the event

magnitudes, ASC (i.e., for a postulated pressure decrease, construct a probability
distribution for a decreasing magnitude)
6.

For each special-cause event, construct a distribution for operator response

time, τ.
7.

For each special-cause event, conduct the simulation study according to

the algorithm described in Figure 2.3 to simulate the range of possible event
magnitudes, ASC, and operator response time, τ.
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8.

Estimate parameters of a distribution model (e.g., Beta distribution)

representing the data generated in Step 7 – this is used as an informed prior
distribution (Gelman et al., 2013).
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Start

Stop

m=1

f(x)=Beta(α,β)

Am ~ g 1(A m)

Solve for (α,β):
μ = α/(α+β)
σ2 = αβ/([α+β ]2⨯[α+β+1])
α>0, β>0

n=1
i=0

Var[f(x)] =
Σ((jm-μ)2)/(M-1) = σ2

τ ~ g2(τ)
E[f(x)] = Σ(jm)/M = μ

Run Simulation with
Am, and τ

n=n+1

m=m+1

True

SS Fails
False

i=i+1
True

True
False
n<N

False
jm = i/N

m<M

Figure 2.3. Sampling algorithm used in Steps 7 and 8 in Table 2.1.
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2.5.

Steam-Methane Reforming (SMR) Process

A typical SMR process is shown in Figure 2.4. After pretreatment, natural gas
feed (70) and steam (560) are mixed before entering the process tubes of an SMR unit
(90), where hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide are produced. This hot
process gas (100) is then cooled and sent to a water-gas shift converter (110), where
carbon monoxide and water are converted to hydrogen and carbon dioxide. The process
gas effluent (120) is cooled in another heat exchanger, producing stream 170, which is
sent to two water extractors. Note that the last section of this heat exchanger is used to
transfer heat to a boiler feed water makeup stream in an adjacent process. The gaseous
hydrogen, methane, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, in stream 210, are sent to PSA
beds. Here, high-purity hydrogen is produced (220), and the PSA-offgas is sent to a
surge drum. Stream 800 from the surge drum is mixed with hot air (830) and a small
amount of natural gas makeup (815), and sent to the furnace side, where it is combusted
to provide heat to the highly-endothermic process-side reactions. Its hot stack gas (840)
is sent through an economizer, where it is used to heat steam (520), some of which is
used on the process side (560), with the rest available for use or sale as a steam product
(570).
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Figure 2.4. SMR process flow diagram

In modeling for process safety, emphasis should be placed on units that present
the greatest risk; i.e., have the largest probabilities of incidents multiplied by incident cost
(Kalantamia et al., 2009). In an SMR process, temperatures rise above 1,300 K with
pressures over 20 atm. Because overheating can lead to process-tube damage and failure,
potentially leading to safety concerns, its model received special attention in this work.
Partial differential and algebraic equations (PDAE’s), that is, momentum, energy and
species balances, accounted for variations of pressure, temperature, and composition in
the axial direction for both the process- and furnace-side gases. For the reforming tubes,
the rigorous kinetic model (Xu et al., 1989) was used, while the furnace-gas combustion
reactions were modeled using a parabolic heat-release profile. Convection and radiation
were modeled on the furnace-side, where view factors were estimated using Monte-Carlo
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simulations and gray-gas assumptions.

The heat transfer on the process side was

modeled by convection only, assuming a pseudo steady-state between the process gas and
catalyst. Details of the models are Section 2.6.
The PSA beds represent a cyclic process, with beds switched from adsorption to
regeneration on the order of every minute. This type of separation scheme induces
oscillatory behavior throughout the SMR process. As the flow rates, compositions, and
pressures fluctuate in effluent streams from the PSA beds, variables throughout the entire
plant fluctuate as well. In processes with such cyclical units, buffer tanks are often used
to dampen fluctuations. However, typical buffer-tank sizes (comparable to SMR-unit
sizes) reduce the amplitude of these fluctuations by on the order of 50%. Herein, the
SMR process test-bed involves four PSA beds, which operate in a 4-mode scheme, with
each bed undergoing adsorption, depressurization, desorption, and repressurization steps.
PDAE’s are used to model the momentum, energy, and species balances, dynamically
tracking pressure, temperature, and composition in the axial direction.

Langmuir

isotherms are used to model adsorption kinetics. Details of the models are in Section 2.7.
In the full safety process model, the SMR-unit and PSA-bed models are used in
conjunction with dynamic models for the water-gas shift reactor, water extractor, surge
tank, heat exchanger, and steam drum. Furthermore, the controls used with the dynamic
process model are consistent with those used in the real process. The full process is
modeled using the software package, gPROMS. A challenging aspect of the full process
model involves convergence of the PSA-offgas recycle loop.
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To my knowledge, no published SMR model exists with this level of detail. In particular,
this process model combines SMR and PSA-bed units within a plant-wide scheme with
PSA-offgas recycle. The results computed by gPROMS are consistent with the process
data from the industrial plant. This plant-wide model is extremely useful for building
leading indicators and prior distributions of alarm and safety interlock system failure
probabilities.
With a dynamic process model, process engineers can simulate special cause
events and track variable trajectories. Consider an unmeasured 10 percent decrease in the
Btu-rating, due to a composition change of the natural gas feed (40), in Figure 2.4. Note
that the makeup stream (815) on the furnace side is relatively small and is not changed in
the simulation. Initially, because the process stream contains less carbon, less H 2 is
produced.

Because these reactions are endothermic, less heat from the furnace is

consumed by the reactions and the furnace temperature rises, as shown in Figure 2.5.
Also, the process-side temperature increases. Eventually, the low-carbon PSA-offgas
reaches the SMR furnace. With less methane for combustion, the furnace temperature
decreases, as does the temperature of the process gas. This effect is shown in Figure 2.5.
Note that the temperatures oscillate due the natural gas oscillation in stream 800 from the
PSA-offgas surge tank – due to the cyclic nature of the PSA process.
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Figure 2.5.

SMR effluent temperatures for a 10% decrease in the Btu

content of the natural gas feed.

2.5.1. Reformer Model

The SMR herein is a top-fired unit consisting of approximately 400 process tubes.
Steam and CH4 are fed on the process side (Stream 90 in Figure 2.4). In the tubes, H2 is
produced via a set of endothermic reactions. On the furnace side, a fuel source (Stream
817) is combusted to provide heat for the process side. A schematic of the SMR unit is
shown in Figure 2.6 (Latham et al., 2011).
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Figure 2.6. Front-view schematic of SMR.

The model proposed by (Latham et al., 2011), which describes the SMR in the steadystate, was converted to a dynamic model.

Also, for the furnace-side, radiation view

factors replaced the software RADEX used by Latham.

In this work, the SMR is

modeled as four units: the process gas, the process tubes, the furnace gas, and the
reformer brick.

The process gas and the furnace gas are modeled as networks of

PDAE’s, having derivatives with respect to time ( ) and axial direction ( ). Each model
is discretized in the axial direction with central-difference approximations. The resulting
ODEs are integrated in time, with the discretized equations solved for the state variables
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at the end of each time step. The process tubes and reformer brick are modeled as
networks of PDAE’s, having derivatives with respect to time ( ), axial direction ( ), and
lateral direction (y). These are also discretized in the spatial coordinates with central
difference approximations.
In the process and furnace gas models, the state variables are the molar flow rates of each
species i ( ) and temperature ( ). For the process gas, the mass balances for species i
are:

(2.8)

and the energy balance is:

(2.9)

where

is the concentration of species i, AC is the cross-sectional area of a process tube,

is the stoichiometric coefficient of species i in reaction j, Cv is the molar heat capacity
at constant volume, Cp is the molar heat capacity at constant pressure, h is the heattransfer coefficient, r is the inner tube radius, Ttube is the tube wall temperature, and
is the enthalpy of reaction j. The heat capacities are functions of Ci, which are functions
of

and

:

,
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(2.10)

(2.11)

(2.12)

These functions are used in Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9).
The reaction rates are calculated using the kinetic model of (Xu et al., 1989),
which involves three reforming reactions:

(R2.1)
(R2.2)
(R2.3)

The reaction rates are:

(2.13)

(2.14)

(2.15)

where:
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and

,

, and

are constants and η is a parameter that describes the diffusion-

limitation of the reaction.
Note that R2 and R3 are highly endothermic. The Ergun equation is used to solve
for the pressure:

(2.16)

where:

and ρ is the gas density, vs is the superficial gas velocity, Dp is the catalyst particle
diameter, is the void fraction, and μ is the gas viscosity.
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The furnace gas model is similar with one major exception: radiation heat transfer
is included in the energy balance. The radiation heat loss rate emitted by a volume of gas
is characterized as:

(2.17)

where

is the gas volume,

temperature, and pressure),

is the gas emissivity (a function of composition,
is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, and T is the absolute

temperature. When incorporating radiation into the model, it is critical to remember that
radiation can travel from any one section of the furnace unit to another without being
absorbed first.

Said differently, each discretized section of furnace gas undergoes

radiation heat transfer with each other discretized section of furnace gas, as well as each
discretized section of process tube and reformer brick that is exposed to the furnace gas.
It should be noted that the radiation heat-loss rate emitted by the process tubes and the
reformer brick are, respectively:

(2.18)
(2.19)

where Atube is the tube area for heat transfer, Awall is the wall area for heat transfer, and
εtube and εwall are the emissivities of the tube and wall. Thus, the energy balance for the
discretized furnace gas volume p is:
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The coefficients
zone

represent the probability that a ray of radiation leaving the radiation

is absorbed by zone . These are calculated using Monte-Carlo techniques. At

each radiation zone, a large number of points are randomly chosen, each with a random
direction (representing a ray of radiation emitted). Each ray’s absorption is tracked,
permitting the estimation of

for radiation heat transfer between zones p and q. Also,

the probability of a furnace zone absorbing a ray of radiation depends upon the zone’s
value, with high
low

values characterizing a ‘gray’ gas, which readily absorbs radiation, and

values characterizing a ‘clear’ gas which lets radiation pass through. Therefore,

the temperature, composition, and pressure of the furnace gas affect each

within the

furnace (Hottel et al., 1967). Because the Monte-Carlo integration for determining each
is difficult to install in gPROMS, the Monte-Carlo integration was carried out off36

line for a grid of reasonable temperature, pressure, and composition values. Within
gPROMS, values of

are interpolated from this grid.

Figure 2.7 shows solutions for the temperature profiles on the process- and furnace-sides
of the SMR for typical operation. On the furnace side, the temperature quickly rises in
the first third of the unit, where the combustion reaction takes place. Over the next two
thirds of the unit, the temperature on the furnace side decreases as heat is transferred to
the process side. On the process side, the temperature increases throughout, however its
slope is greatest where the furnace gas is hottest. Species flow rates on the process side
are shown in Figure 2.8, with the bulk of H2 produced in the top section, and more than
half of the CH4 consumed.

Also note that the reformer is sufficiently long, and

consequently, little reaction takes place near its bottom.

Figure 2.7. Temperature profile in the SMR.
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Figure 2.8. Mole fraction profile on the process-side of the SMR.

2.5.2. Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) Model

The pressure-swing adsorption model consists of four beds, each of which is described by
a set of PDE’s (derivatives are taken with respect to time and the axial direction) and
associated boundary conditions.

The PSA cycle consists of four steps: adsorption,

depressurization, desorption, pressurization. At any given time, one of the beds is in each
step, cycling to the next step every minute. To model the PSA process, just a single 4bed unit was used, with each bed triple its size in the plant. These beds are sufficiently
large to adsorb all of the carbon-compounds during the 1-minute adsorption step. Also, a
larger surge tank is used to dampen the bed swings, because three 4-bed groups cycle out
of phase, creating destructive interference among the limit cycles.
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Using the method of lines, the PDEs were discretized in the axial direction with centraldifference approximations (and forward/backward differences at the boundaries) to
represent the derivatives with respect to distance. Then, backward-difference formulae
were used to integrate the resulting ODEs in time. The following state variables were
used in modeling the beds: temperature, pressure, gas density, gas velocity, mole fraction
of each species, loading of each species on the adsorbent, and the equilibrium loading of
each species on the adsorbent.

The Langmuir Isotherm was used to calculate the

equilibrium loading of each species.
Below is the schedule used for a 4-bed PSA cycle, similar to that implemented by
Agarwal et al. (Agarwal et al., 2008), and Khajuria and Pistokopolous (Khajuria et al.,
2011) (for a 2-bed cycle) and used herein. The four beds (A, B, C, and D), shown
schematically in Figure 2.9a, cycle through four steps, 1-4, during modes 1-4. Initially,
just prior to the first mode, bed A is at high pressure (HP) and unoccupied (U) by species
to be adsorbed; bed B is also at HP, but occupied (O); bed C is at low pressure (LP) and
O; and bed D is at LP and U. The valves are open or closed as shown. During the first
mode, bed A implements step 1; bed B, step 2; bed C, step 3; and bed D, step 4. In mode
2, A moves to step 2, B to step 3, C to step 4, and D to step 1. Similar moves are made
for the third and fourth modes. For the PSA in the SMR process, the beds are occupied
with CH4, CO, and CO2, and unoccupied with H2, which is used to desorb the adsorbents
– HP > 20atm, and LP = 1.5 atm – each mode (and step) is of duration, 1 min.
Next, the four steps are described, focusing on bed A. Note that Figures 2.9a-d, show the
states of each bed and the valve positions at the start of each mode. In this analysis, it is
assumed that the valves are adjusted instantaneously.
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Step 1: Adsorption in bed A (see Figure 2.9a at outset of mode 1)

o

Step 1 begins with bed A at HP and U

o

The water extractor effluent (210) is fed to the base of bed A (valve A1 open)

o

A high-purity stream of H2 leaves the bed (valve A3 open), as the adsorbent

accumulates CH4, CO, and CO2 in time, with most of the H2 product sent in stream 220 to
the H2 Product tank, and the remainder sent to bed C (valve C4 open).


Step 2: Depressurization of bed A (see Figure 2.9b at outset of mode 2)

o

Step 2 begins with the valve A1 and A3 closed.

o

Gas exits the pressurized bed through the base of bed A (valve A2 open), and in

time the pressure in the bed equilibrates to a lower pressure (pressure of the surge tank)



Step 3: Desorption in bed A (see Figure 2.9c at outset of mode 3)

o

Step 3 begins with valve A4 open, with H2 product from bed C entering the top of

bed A
o

Reminder: bed A is at LP and O

o

In time, the H2 product adsorbs on the adsorbent and the CH4, CO, and CO2 is

released into the PSA-offgas


Step 4: Pressurization of bed A (see Figure 2.9d at outset of mode 4)

o

Step 4 begins with valve A2 and A4 closed

o

The water extractor effluent (210) is fed to the base of bed A (valve A1 open)

o

In time, the pressure of bed A equilibrates to the pressure of stream 210
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a. Mode 1 of the PSA cycle
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b. Mode 2 of the PSA cycle
Figure 2.9. Schematic of PSA process.
41

D1

H2
Product

A4

A3

B4

B3

C4

C3

D4

D3

S3, O, LP

S4, U, LP

S1, U, HP

S2, O, HP

A

B

C

D

A2

B2

C2

D2

To PSA Surge
Tank

A1

B1

C1

D1

Water Extractor
Effluent

c. Mode 3 of the PSA cycle
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d. Mode 4 of the PSA cycle
Figure 2.9. Schematic of PSA process (Cont'd.)
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To evaluate process safety using dynamic risk analysis, it's important to monitor the
breakthrough of CH4, CO, and CO2 in the product H2 stream. Previous models did not
consider simulating a carbon breakthrough into the H2 product stream, since they use a
semi-infinite boundary condition with respect to molar composition at the end of the bed
(Agarwal et al., 2008; Khajuria et al., 2011). The model developed herein uses the same
boundary condition, but at the end of an elongated bed. In this way, the semi-infinite
B.C. (zero derivative) is maintained at the end of the elongated bed, but a methane or
CO/CO2 breakthrough at the end of the bed can be observed. Shown in Figure 2.10 is the
mole fraction of H2 in the PSA bed during Step 1 of the PSA cycle. The mole fraction of
H2 along the bed is shown minute-by-minute. In time, the purity of the H2 product
stream, taken at the exit of the 1 meter long bed, drops below an acceptable level (set
point). Clearly, this model is capable of simulating a carbon breakthrough into the H2
product stream.
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Figure 2.10. Simulated mole fraction of H2 along the PSA bed during Step 1.

The most important aspect of the PSA modeling as it relates to dynamic risk analysis of
the SMR process is the oscillations in the PSA-offgas. PSA-offgas is fed to the surge
tank from the PSA bed undergoing Step 3 (desorption.) When a PSA bed switches to
Step 3, its concentration of carbon compounds is the highest.

This is because the

adsorbent near the bottom of the bed, z = 0, contains the most

/

/

. In Step 3,

the carbon compounds are continuously desorbed, and consequently, the concentration of
H2 in the PSA-offgas increases. Because the PSA-offgas provides fuel for the furnace
side of the SMR, the oscillations in its Btu-rating are important. Most significant, for the
4-bed model, are the oscillations in the effluent for the surge drum, which are shown in
Figure 2.11. This is consistent with documentation for the industrial process studied.

44

Figure 2.11. Simulated PSA-offgas Btu-rating
2.6. SMR Informed Prior Distributions

For the SMR process in Figure 2.4, a loss in steam pressure to the reformer-side
(stream 560), was simulated with the responses of the safety systems monitored. For
small disturbances, the process control system handled the effect of steam pressure
decreases. There is a flow controller on the steam line, whose set point is generated using
a linear equation involving the flow of natural gas into the SMR process-side, seeking to
achieve a constant steam-to-carbon ratio in the process tubes.

This control system

normally arrests typical fluctuations in steam pressure and flow rate, but for large steampressure decreases, feedback control alone is insufficient. In this case, the control valve
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is wide-open, with a flow rate insufficient to accompany natural gas fed to the SMR-unit.
For this reason, an investigation was undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the alarm
systems associated with the SMR steam line. When the steam flow rate is below its Lalarm threshold, the steam-to-carbon ratio drops, accompanied by an increase in the
process-side temperature, and potential tube failure. Because of these operating limits, an
interlock was placed at the HH-alarm threshold with a time delay. This time delay, of
several seconds, reflects that the temperature threshold may be exceeded in this case for a
short period of time and permits the operator to respond rapidly in an attempt to bring the
furnace temperature below its HH-alarm threshold.
Three operator responses to the alarm are simulated: (1) the valve on the steam line is
opened, (2) the valve on the makeup fuel line is pinched, and (3) the dampers associated
with air flow in the furnace are opened (effectively increasing air flow rate). When the
operator is able to bring the furnace temperature below the HH-threshold before the
interlock delay times out, an automatic shutdown is avoided. If, however, the operator is
unable to do so, the interlock is activated and a plant shutdown occurs. The simulated
abnormal event leads to either a success of SS2 (interlock is avoided), or a failure of SS2
(interlock is activated). It is desirable to have a reliable estimate of x2, the probability
that the operator is not successful, despite only a few activations of this HH-alarm during
the recorded history over several years.
Herein, a pressure decrease in the steam line to the process-side of the SMR-unit
was simulated. The magnitude of the pressure decrease was a random variable, sampled
from a normal distribution centered at 50% of stream pressure. The response time of the
operator was taken as a random variable, sampled from a uniform distribution ranging
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from 0 to 15 seconds. The operators three responses were all incorporated into the
simulation as step-changes in valve settings. One thousand simulations were run, and the
effectiveness of the operator’s response in each simulation was tracked.

In some

simulations, the operator successfully reduced the furnace temperature below the
interlock threshold in the allotted time before the automatic shut-down. In others, the
operator failed and the plant was shut-down. In Figure 2.12, a temperature trajectories
for events resulting in an interlock activation and in a near-miss are shown. In the
scenario where SS2 succeeds, the temperature is brought below the interlock threshold
within the interlock delay time. Note that the action of the control system was observed
early in the trajectory, but it was insufficient to avoid the abnormal event and eventual
plant shut-down. The average number of safety-system failures was recorded for the
simulations, as well as the failure variance, which were used to generate a betadistribution to describe the failure probabilities. The beta-distribution, which has just two
parameters, was created easily and is supported only in the range [0,1], which bounds the
failure probability.
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Figure 2.12. Furnace outlet temperature for a decrease in steam pressure.

This informed prior distribution was built using dynamic simulations with firstprinciple models.

Even with no data available to update the distribution, process

engineers and plant operators can make improved risk predictions (Levenson et al., 2014).
The alarm data are used to build a likelihood distribution, in this case a binomial
likelihood distribution of a few trials, all of which are successes. In Figure 2.13, the prior
and posterior distributions are shown. The informed posterior is shifted to the left of the
prior distribution by the 0 percent failure rate observed in the data. Unlike the commonly
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used uninformed prior distributions, its posterior distribution has a similar shape to its
informed prior distribution. The posterior distribution generated using the informed prior
distribution can alert process engineers that a significant decrease in steam pressure has
the high probability (>20%) of causing a plant shutdown. This may lead operators to pay
special attention to the steam pressure measurements, and may lead process engineers to
install a more robust controller on the steam line.

Figure 2.13.

Prior and posterior distributions generated by dynamic

simulations
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2.7.

Conclusions

A method, involving repeated dynamic process simulations, for constructing informed
prior distributions was presented.

The method was used in estimating the failure

probabilities of alarm and safety interlock systems that are rarely called into action in
chemical processes. The method requires combining a dynamic, first-principles, process
model with the control, and alarm and safety interlock systems. Its application was
demonstrated for offline dynamic risk analysis of a steam-methane reformer (SMR)
process. The high probability of a plant shutdown calculated by the method can alert
operators to pay special attention to the steam pressure measurements, and may lead
process engineers to improve the controller on the steam line, avoiding or reducing the
cost of plant shutdowns. Key aspects of the reformer/furnace and PSA models used to
demonstrate the proposed methodology were presented.

The modeling of probable

operator responses with respect to operator skill, shift (day or night shift), severity of
alarm (H/L or HH/LL), and the difficulty of diagnosing the special cause, among other
factors, is considered in Chapter 3.
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2.8.
A

NOMENCLATURE
area

Am

special-cause magnitude m

D

observed alarm data

i

failure counter; number of failures for a sampled special-cause magnitude

jm

observed failure probability for a sampled special-cause magnitude, m

m

special-cause magnitude counter, m = 1, ..., M

M

number of sampled special-cause magnitudes

n

sample operator variables counter, n = 1, ..., N

N

number of sampled operator variables per special-cause sample

p

number of possible operator response orders (sequences)

SSi

safety system i

xi

failure probability of a safety system i

Greek
α

first parameter of the Beta distribution

β

second parameter of the Beta distribution

ε

emissivity

ΔP

sampled pressure decrease

µ

average value of jm

µSC

average of sampled special-cause magnitude

σ2

variance of jm

σ2SC

variance of sampled special-cause magnitude

τ

operator response time

τmax

maximum operator response time
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Chapter 3
Improved Predictions of Alarm and Safety System Performance
Through Process And Operator Response-Time Modeling

3.1. Introduction

In the chemical process industries, there are many incentives to mitigate the
frequency and consequences of incidents and accidents (“U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board”). To evaluate the effectiveness of alarm and safety interlock
systems reliably, the probabilities of alarm and safety interlock failures and the failure
consequences must be quantified. Said differently, to compare two safety systems,
quantitative estimates for their effectiveness in mitigating special causes are needed,
where a special cause is a disturbance the basic process control system is unable to arrest.
This work proposes a method of improving process models and introduces new
probabilistic models that describe special-cause event occurrences and operator responsetimes, allowing for estimating alarm and safety-system failure probabilities more
accurately. In industrial practice, methods such as HAZOP and HAZAN are commonly
utilized to make safety and reliability estimates of processes on a unit-operation basis.
The estimated failure probabilities (from statistical data and manufacturer estimates) of
specific components are used to estimate failure probabilities in a process. But, more
recently, dynamic risk analysis has been employed to update these probabilities as realtime data are measured. The focus herein is on events that are inherently rare, where
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failure predictions remain uncertain. A process model is utilized to generate simulation
data that enhance sparse measured data. The effects of decisions involving process
models, special-cause events, and operator behavior, on risk predictions are investigated.
An informed prior distribution was constructed in Chapter 2, shown in Figure
2.13, to estimate the distribution of failure probabilities ( ) of the safety system
associated with the HH-Temperature alarm (

) in the SMR furnace.

Special-cause

events were repeatedly simulated involving a substantial decrease of steam pressure at the
inlet of the SMR reactor – sufficient to cause the furnace temperature to rise out of its
green-belt zone through its yellow-belt zone, and into its red-belt zone. It was shown that
without operator actions, the short interlock time delay,
process would undergo an automatic shutdown.

, would elapse and the

When the operators responded

sufficiently quickly to the special-cause event, simulations showed the process often
returning to its green-belt zone, with the interlock shutdown avoided. The distribution of
the simulation results estimates that
pressure decreases; i.e.,

fails at about a 20% rate during these dramatic

the process is estimated to undergo an automatic shutdown in

20% of these rare cases - this is not a projection of the process accident rate or the
interlock shutdown rate.
In process operation,

responded successfully to the rare HH-alarm

activations, resulting in sparse alarm data. A binomial likelihood distribution was used to
calculate the posterior distribution of
data were successful
prior distribution.

given the alarm data . Since all of the collected

actions, the posterior distribution is shifted to the left of the

With just a handful of
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activations, the resulting likelihood

distribution has a very large variance, and the accuracy of the informed prior distribution
to the posterior distribution is uncertain. If the process had undergone hundreds of
activations, the accuracy could be assessed. This poses a major challenge – how can the
user be confident that the process and operator behavior models are sufficiently accurate
given few data to assess the accuracy of the informed prior distribution? If the models
used to generate the informed prior distribution do not predict the special-cause event
well, the results obtained from the posterior distribution may be unreliable.

3.2. Development and Refinement of Models to Construct Informed Prior
Distributions

Over years of process operation,

activations are infrequent, but still provide

sufficient data for studying the propagation of special-cause events. The activation of
is rarer, occurring

times less frequently – often resulting in very sparse data.

While the data associated with

are insufficient alone to analyze the performance of

the safety system, the similarities between the safety systems can be utilized. The
activations of both safety systems originate from a control system failure, which, for
example, can be due the large magnitude of the disturbance, the inability of the control
system to handle the disturbance, and/or the occurrence of an electrical or mechanical
failure. It is assumed that the same group of operators are involved. If highly skilled,
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they should arrest the special-causes at a high rate (Meel et al., 2007; Meel et al., 2008;
Chang et al., 2007).
Clearly, the need for urgent responses of

are greater. Also, when operators

take action (e.g., as furnace temperatures become elevated), the need to respond within
the interlock delay times dominate their concerns and actions. This would normally
stimulate a strong reaction to avoid automatic shutdown.
As the fundamental basis for the proposed method, a sufficiently-accurate firstprinciples process model is needed. Also, the automated safety system models should be
sufficiently accurate. The second model, represented by

in Figure 2.3, is the

distribution of special-cause event magnitudes to be simulated. The operator behavior
model,

, unlike automatic safety systems, must reflect human behaviors. Here, the

speed and effectiveness of operator responses often depend on the state of the process,
the number of competitive active alarms, distractions, personal health and conflicts, and
the like.
In the method introduced herein, first,

models are constructed and validated

with plentiful data. After constructing these models, and validating them with measured
data, they are modified to handle

activations (recognizing that their rare

occurrences do not allow for reliable model validation). In the next three sections, all
three models are described with respect to

. Their modifications to handle

activations are then described. Lastly, the failure probability estimates generated by
using the

informed prior distributions are presented.
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3.2.1. Dynamic Process Models

Because dynamic first-principles process models are widely used, approaches to
model development are not considered here. Instead, this section focuses on model
evaluation and improvement for constructing informed prior distributions.
Often, process engineers have developed dynamic process models for control
scheme testing during the design phase. These are commonly used initially for carrying
out dynamic risk analysis. However, process models used for process design and control
are normally developed to track responses in their typical operating regimes (green-belt
zones) – but may not respond to special-cause events with sufficient accuracy; i.e., their
predictions far from set points may be poor for risk analysis. Consequently, dynamic
process models should often be improved to construct informed prior distributions.
For the SMR process shown in Figure 2.4, four dynamic process models are
constructed, as summarized in Figure 3.1. The first, Process Model A, is the same as the
one described in Chapter 2. This model includes constitutive equations to model the
endothermic reformer reactions, the furnace that provides their heat, the exothermic
water-gas shift reaction, the separation of hydrogen product from offgas in adsorption
beds, and the production of steam (for process heating or sale), as well as models of
associated PID controllers.
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Figure 3.1. Steam-methane reforming process models.

In Process Model A, to model the radiative heat transfer (~90% of the total heat
transfer to the tubes), view factors are estimated from each surface or volume zone to
each other zone, with the dynamics of radiative heat transfer modeled between all
discretized zones (Hottel et al., 1967). The remaining convective heat transfer is simpler,
because heat transfer only occurs between physically adjacent zones (Latham et al.,
2011).
In Process Models B and D, convection heat transfer is modeled only, with
radiative heat transfer accounted for by overstating the heat-transfer coefficients between
the furnace gases and tube surfaces. Herein, to estimate the overstated heat-transfer
coefficients, 50 steady-state windows were identified in the historical process data. Each
window corresponds to a duration of operation, on the order of a day, where process
variables are at steady state. Many different steady-state windows exist in the process
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data due to different demand rates of hydrogen and steam, different feed ratios of steam
to natural gas, and natural aging of the catalyst (in the reformer as well as the water-gas
shift reactor). The heat-transfer coefficient was estimated from the temperature and flow
rate of the process and furnace gas inlet and outlet measurements.
In Process Models A and B, the reforming reaction kinetics proposed by (Xu et
al., 1989), which have been shown to be quite accurate over a broad range of
temperatures and reactant concentrations, are used. Note that, due to the presence of a
complex denominator in the kinetic equations, the spatially-distributed SMR model can
be difficult to converge. Accurate guess values for the concentration of the reactants and
products along the axial direction of the reformer tubes must be available, or generated
using homotopy-continuation techniques, to converge the steady-state model.
However, in Process Models C and D, elementary reaction kinetic equations are simpler
to converge. The rate constants of the elementary reactions are estimated, similar to the
convection heat-transfer coefficients. Using the data in the 50 steady-state windows,
along with measured hydrogen product flow rates and offgas concentrations, the rate
constants are estimated.

.

Initially, the four process models are compared in the 50 steady-state windows.
Beginning with the measured inlet temperatures and flow rates for each mode, predicted
and measured outlet temperatures are compared for each model. The root-mean square
outlet temperature differences are shown in Figure 3.2. For this steady-state evaluation,
Process Model A provided the best agreement with the data, whereas Process Model D
was least accurate.
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Figure 3.2. Process model goodness-of-fit using steady-state and dynamic
evaluations.

However, because the models are used to estimate the responses to special-cause events,
agreement with dynamics data is more important.

Fifty dynamic windows were

identified in the historical process data – periods of time where the process variables
describing the operation of the steam-methane reforming reactor are transient. These
windows are on the order of minutes to hours, and typically arise when hydrogen or
steam demand rates change, feed ratios of steam to natural gas change, or operational
changes occur in another process unit (such as a pair of pressure-swing adsorbent beds
are taken offline). For each of the 50 dynamic windows, inlet temperature and flow rate
trajectories are input to each model, with model-predicted outlet temperature trajectories
compared to measured outlet temperature trajectories.

Dynamic predictions are

typically less accurate than the steady-state ones. Here, Process Model B outperforms
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Process Model C, but when comparing just steady-state outlet temperature differences,
Process Model C provides a closer fit to the data. Clearly, Process Model B should be
selected, rather than Process Model C, when constructing informed prior distributions.
Next, the four process models are used to construct informed prior distributions for the
failure of SS1 – using the uniform distributions for special-cause magnitude and operator
behavior used in Chapter 2. The 300 measured SS1 failures/successes are then used to
construct a low-variance binomial likelihood distribution (see Eq. (2.4)). The four
informed prior distributions for the failure of SS1 and the binomial distribution are shown
in Figure 3.3.

To compare the informed four prior distributions with this likelihood

distribution, the ξi,m index is defined:

(3.1)

where i represents the model (i = A, B, C, D) and m represents the data-based likelihood
distribution. This index ranges from [0, 1], where unity corresponds to perfect matching
between the informed prior distribution of model i and the measured likelihood
distribution m. As shown in Table 3.1, this index is consistent with the dynamic model
accuracies in Figure 3.2, but low levels of agreement are obtained. Note that using more
detailed operator response-time models, in the next subsection, the performance indices
are improved significantly.
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Figure 3.3. Informed prior distributions created using the four process models, as
well as the binomial likelihood distribution created using the measured alarm data.

Table 3.1. Performance Index for Process Models A-D.

ξi,m

Process
Model A

Process
Model B

Process
Model C

Process
Model D

0.159

0.063

0.045

0.026

3.2.2. Special-Cause Event Occurrence Model

When constructing informed prior distributions to estimate the failure
probabilities of safety systems that act infrequently, it is important to assess the specialcause events that can activate specific safety systems. Given that process units fail in
many ways (e.g., as inlet stream compositions, temperatures, flow rates, and pressures
vary; controllers experience measurement bias; valves malfunction; controller electronic
61

mechanisms fail), special-cause modeling deserves attention.

Clearly, for specific

special-cause events, known to trigger safety systems, it is crucial to account for them
when creating informed prior distributions. Some are known to have a high likelihood of
occurrence over the lifetime of a plant, while others may be un-observed locally, having
occurred at other plant sites or even related plants. For all potential special-cause events,
a probability distribution should be constructed, even when likelihood data are
unavailable.
When developing occurrence models to estimate safety system failure
probabilities, special-cause events must be selected and their magnitudes must be
investigated, as special-cause events are likely to have devastating consequences (e.g.,
propagation of runaway reactions, leading to explosions). To identify these events,
HAZOP and LOPA analyses, especially, are particularly helpful. HAZOP is the industry
standard for postulating all possible special-cause events.
The effect of a special-cause event (SCE) depends on its magnitude. SCE models
(e.g.,

in Figure 2.3) are needed to estimate failure probability distributions. SCE

models having low expected values are most representative and rarely activate secondlevel alarms, while SCE models having high expected values represent extreme cases,
allowing for the study of second-level alarms.

Various steam-pressure-decrease

magnitudes are shown in Figure 3.4 – each being a delta function centered at its
corresponding point on the abscissa. The expected value of the SS1 failure probability, jm,
is graphed accordingly.
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Figure 3.4. SS1 failure probability as a function of a steam pressure decrease.

3.2.3. Operator Response-Time Models

In the simulation of a special-cause event, the behavior of the operator must be
well understood. In Figure 2.3,

represents operator response times in taking action

following activated alarms associated with SS1. An initial construction of

can be

made using the histogram of operator response times to high-frequency alarms. This
provides valuable information about how the operators tend to act when a variable is
under alarm (Macwan et al. 1994; Bendoyl et al., 2006; Stylios et al., 1999). In some
cases, when operators anticipate that the alarm thresholds have been set conservatively,
they are slower to respond to expected nuisance alarms. On the other hand, when
operators recognize that alarms tend to trigger a flood of alarms elsewhere in the process,
they view these alarms as critical – even though they just signal entry into the yellow-belt
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zone. To the extent possible, it is important to make quantifiable justifications when
modeling operator effectiveness (Hollnagel, 1998; Reason, 2000).
A histogram of approximately 300 observed operator response times to the Halarm associated with the SMR furnace effluent temperature (Moskowitz et al., 2015) is
shown in Figure 3.5. The operator response times are collected using the alarm data log,
which records the time of each alarm activation and the time of each operator
manipulation. The time between an alarm activation and the initial operator manipulation
is the operator response time. This calculation method provides the most accurate data
on operator response time. Alarm data are convenient to work with, but without alarm
data, process data can be sampled to obtain operator response times. A script can be
written to record the times process variables cross their thresholds, as well as the times
controlled-variable set points or actuators undergo step-changes (considered to be
operator actions) (Pariyani et al., 2012a). In either case, the data sampling interval is
important to consider.

If data are sampled or recorded infrequently (such as by a

composition analyzer), operator response times may be inaccurate. Depending upon the
frequency of process data points, reasonable estimates of operator response times can be
obtained. The wide range of operator response times, nearly all well represented, suggest
many kinds of operator actions. The highest number of responses are associated with the
shortest response times – with operators taking action in less than one minute. Nearly all
of the operator response times lie between zero and six minutes, with far fewer of longer
duration. Past a six minute response time, the number of responses decreases rapidly,
with just three response times beyond eight minutes.
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Figure 3.5. Operator response time histogram.

Two parametric distributions are proposed to model the operator response-time
distribution. The first distribution is an exponential distribution, which is called Operator
Response-Time Model A:

(3.2)

where

is a parameter to be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function:

(3.3)
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where i is the response counter, n is the total number of response times measured (on the
order of 300), and

is response time i. It is often convenient to maximize the log-

likelihood function instead of the likelihood function:

(3.4)

The maximum of the log-likelihood function has a simple analytical form:

(3.5)
where

is the sample mean of the measured response times.
The second is a weighted-sum of three gamma distributions (Operator Response-

Time Model B):

(3.6)

where each

is a weighting coefficient for gamma distribution j, and where

and

are

the parameters of gamma distribution j. While any number of gamma distributions can
be used, here the fourth distribution gives a negligible increase in the likelihood function
(compared to the impact of the third distribution). The eight parameters in Eq. (3.7) are
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function:
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(3.7)

Using Newton’s optimization method with an analytical Hessian matrix, the parameter
values in Table 3.2 were estimated.

Table 3.2. Parameters for Operator Response-Time Models A and B.

0.39

1.83

3.56

4.51

0.68

1.04

0.88

0.48

0.07

0.45

While Operator Response-Time Models A and B represent operator response
times well, they do not account for the rate of change of each variable crossing its alarm
threshold, as well as the number of activated alarms being monitored by an operator(s).
Clearly, operator responses gain urgency, and often speed, when a variable crosses one of
its thresholds rapidly. Also, as the number of active alarms decreases, operators are less
distracted and respond more rapidly.
To account for the rate of change of each variable when the variable crosses an
alarm threshold, using the SMR plant data, operator response times are displayed in
Figure 3.6 as a function of the furnace effluent temperature derivative,

, as the

temperature crosses its high-alarm threshold. The dependence of the operator response
time, , on the rate of change is well-described by:

(3.8)
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where

and

are the model parameters.

These parameters are estimated by

minimizing the sum of the squared errors:
(3.9)

The estimated values of

and

as well as the corresponding

value are

given in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.6. Operator response time as a function of temperature rate of change
(plant data and model prediction).
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Table 3.3. Parameters Used for Operator Response-Time Models C, D and E.
[min]
4.33

[s/K]
1.54

To construct a

[min]
302

3.8

413

that accounts for the alarmed variable time-derivative, a

stochastic component must be maintained – because if
(like

4.2

were purely deterministic

), the variance of the safety system failure probability with respect to

be calculated.

While

cannot

is an estimate for the operator response time, it must be

incorporated into a random variable distribution for . One choice for
exponential distribution having an expected value equal to
distribution in Eq. (3.8) is known to have an expected value of

.

is the

The exponential

. Therefore, Operator

Response-Time Model C is proposed:

(3.10)

A similar method can be used to account for the effect of multiple alarm activations in the
process. When many alarms are active, competing for operator(s) attention, response
times are expected to increase. Here, also, the exponential distribution is appropriate:

(3.11)
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where

is the reciprocal of active alarms. The parameters

and

are estimated by

minimizing the sum of the squared errors:

(3.12)

The estimated values for

and

as well as the corresponding

value are given in

Table 3.3.
Using this logic, the Operator Response-Time Model D is formulated by setting
the expected value of an exponential distribution equal to

:

(3.13)

Finally, the Operator Response-Time Model E is formulated that incorporates
both

and

. The effectiveness of

and

can be compared by their associated

. Herein, the expected value of Operator Response Model E is set equal to:
(3.14)

where the weighting coefficients for each distribution are proportional to their
This yields Operator Response-Time E model:

(3.15)
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.

Next, Operator Response-Time Models A-E are used to construct informed prior
distributions for the failure probability of SS1, along with dynamic Process Model A. The
results are shown in Figure 3.7, along with the binomial likelihood distribution of the
measured SS1 data, Eq. (2.4). The model performance index, ξi,m, in Eq. (3.1) is used to
quantify the model performance of Operator Response-Time Models A-E, with results
shown in Table 3.4. Operator Response-Time Models A and B, which are independent of
the process state, describe the measured alarm data poorly.

As expected, Operator

Response-Time Model B, with eight parameters, performs better than Operator
Response-Time Model A, with just a single parameter. The incorporation of

and

in

Operator Response-Time Models C and D, clearly improves the informed prior
distributions, with Model C performing better than Model D – expected because

<

. Of the five models, Model E is in the closest agreement with the likelihood data.
Given preferred Model E, the choice of process model can be revisited. In Figure 3.8, the
four dynamic process models are used to build informed prior distributions with Operator
Response-Time Model E. The model performance indices are shown for Process Models
A-D in Table 3.5. Once again, Process Model A yields the best agreement with the
observed likelihood data, and can be considered the most appropriate process model.
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Figure 3.7. SS1 informed prior distributions constructed using the five operator
response-time models (ORTMs) with dynamic Process Model A.

Table 3.4. Performance Index for Operator Response-Time Models A-E with
Process Model A.
ξi,m

ORTM A

ORTM B

ORTM C

ORTM D

ORTM E

0.029

0.030

0.633

0.701

0.812
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Figure 3.8. SS1 informed prior distributions constructed using the four process
models with Operator Response-Time Model E.

Table 3.5. Performance Index Revisited for Process Models A-D Using Operator
Response-Time Model E.
Process
Model A
ξi,m 0.812

3.3. Modeling

Process
Model B

Process
Model C

Process
Model D

0.481

0.325

0.051

Failures Using Models with Parameters Estimated from

Failures
Once the three types of models (process, special-cause event, and operator
response-time models) are chosen and their parameters are estimated, they are used to
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estimate the failure probabilities of

. These models must then be adjusted to handle

simulations that involve the activation of

(i.e., after the failure of

). While it is

desirable to keep the models intact, a few adjustments are recommended.
The dynamic process model, Process Model A, should not be altered much to
activation events – because the simulations from high and high-high alarms,

simulate

and beyond, are similar, with small changes in physical properties as temperatures rise.
In general, Process Model A adjustments would be required when physical and chemical
phenomena change abruptly – for example, with shifts from laminar to turbulent flows, or
the introduction of two-phase flows.
The Special-Cause Event Occurrence Model needs significant adjustment because the
distribution used for simulating L/H alarm activations infrequently activates
LL/HH alarms. To achieve this, a normal distribution is chosen for
mean

and standard deviation

bounded by

. A lower-tail, bounded by

, having

and an upper-tail

, each two standard deviations from the mean, are defined:
(3.16)

noting that

is a special-cause magnitude closer to zero; that is, closer to typical

operation. The normal distribution is described by

and

, rather than the typical

mean and standard deviation:
(3.17)
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The lower bound of

is set at

with smaller choices of

values for which the L/H alarms failed in simulation –

yielding many simulations where the LL/HH alarms are not

activated. Referring to Figure 3.4, with SS1 failures frequently observed when
0.4 is a good lower bound for

.

,

is set such that the special-cause events are of

interest and relevance. Three Special-Cause Event Occurrence models are shown in
Figure 3.9, each sharing

. SCEM A has

closest to

, and samples special

cause events that are most likely (closest to typical operation), yet have the least potential
for SS2 failures. The other extreme is SCEM C, which has
B, having
failures.

furthest from

. SCEM

, is chosen as an interior candidate to analyze the risk of SS2
The choice of

has a significant impact on the estimated failure

probabilities – the user must keep this in mind when analyzing the simulation results and
making statements about the risk of the process. The failure probability estimate attempts
to describe the probability of failure while undergoing a special-cause event sampled
, which is very different than typical day-to-day process fluctuations.
20
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Figure 3.9. Special-Cause Event Models for SS2 simulation.
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1

The Operator Response-Time Models also need adjustment, it being expected that
operators react quicker to alarm activations that are associated with more urgent
consequences. Given an immediate threat of an automatic plant shutdown, operator
actions should be accelerated. To account for this, when
response to the
response to a

is activated to

, the time

activation is divided by the ratio of the 90% percentile of operator
activation,

, over the interlock shutdown time,

. For this case,

the Operator Response-Time Model E takes the form:

(3.18)

Having constructed, chosen, and regressed the three types of models using the Halarm data, adjustments are made to model

activation events. An informed prior

distribution is then constructed for the failure probabilities of

Figure 3.10 shows the

resulting informed prior and associated posterior distributions describing the failure
probability of

.

The sparse alarm data are used to build binomial likelihood

distributions that modify the prior distributions to form posterior distributions. It can be
seen that the most accurate posterior distribution (formed using Process Models A and
Operator Response-Time Model E with an urgency adjustment for time responses in

)

is not shifted as dramatically as the posterior distribution formed using the simple
informed prior distribution. This indicates that the most accurate posterior distribution is
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more effective at handling the special-cause simulations – leading to more accurate
failure probability predictions.

Figure 3.10. Informed prior distributions and associated posterior
distributions describing the failure probability of

.

The interpretation of the posterior distribution is that during a severe loss in steam
pressure, the probability that the process will undergo an automatic shutdown is on the
order of 5%. This allows engineers responsible for setting reliability estimates to have
quantifiable justification when they do so. An estimate for the reliability for various
special-cause events can provide engineers with a broader understanding of the events
that pose the greatest odds of an interlock activation, thus motivating different designs to
handle these events.

The operator also benefits from these distributions, as he/she
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becomes aware that, during such a severe pressure drops, his/her reactions have been
projected to result in interlock activations after on the order of 5% of occurrences. If this
value is perceived to be too high, the operator may be motivated to act more urgently
during this type of event.

3.4. Conclusions

Alarm and safety interlock system failure probabilities are difficult to estimate,
but warrant careful consideration using the strategies introduced herein. The safety of the
operators and employees at a chemical plant, and those in the neighboring community
and environment, is crucial to the chemical process industries.

For safety interlock

systems and their associated alarms, statistical techniques on the sparse records of
activations are alone insufficient to make meaningful evaluations of their failure
probabilities. The usage of alarm and process data associated with the relatively frequent
alarm activations (e.g., H-alarms) to systematically improve the performance of less
frequently activated alarms (e.g., HH-alarms) and safety interlock systems is very
promising. As demonstrated for an SMR plant example, the three types of models can be
applied to a variety of chemical manufacturing processes. The resulting models provide
new insights into the performance of rarely-activated alarm and safety interlock systems,
for which historical data are sparse.
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Chapter 4
Understanding Rare Safety and Reliability Events Using Transition
Path Sampling

4.1. Introduction

Safety and reliability are paramount to the chemical manufacturing industries.
Because chemical plants are often operated at high temperatures and pressures, and with
hazardous materials, the potential for adverse human health and environmental impacts
exists.

With proper process design, effective implementation of control and safety

instrumented (SIS) systems mitigate such risks. Less severe are product losses which
result from poor plant reliability.

As chemical manufacturing processes approach

dangerous operating conditions, automatic safety interlocks activate, shutting them down
before dangerous consequences are realized. When functioning correctly, the dangerous
consequences are avoided, but manufacturing processes lose valuable production over the
time period encompassing the automatic shutdown, process maintenance, and startup.
Furthermore, plant startup is often the most dangerous mode of operation because large
transients are often not as well understood compared with steady-state and cyclic
operations. There is clear motivation, both financially and ethically, to prevent chemical
manufacturing processes from operating in regions where safety interlocks are activated –
resulting in automatic plant shutdowns or potentially in safety incidents.
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Safety interlocks are often based on HAZOP (hazard and operability analysis)
(Kletz, 1999; Venkatasbramanian et al., 1994; Kennedy et al., 1998) and LOPA (layer of
protection analysis) (Dowell, 1998; Summers, 2003). With HAZOP, potential hazards to
personnel and capital equipment that may occur during process operation are identified
through a meticulous (yet qualitative) procedure.

It provides “a more complete

identification of the hazards, including information on how hazards can develop as a
result of operating procedures and operational upsets in the process” (Crowl and Louvar,
1990). With LOPA, the probabilities of identified hazards occurring are maintained
under a low, pre-specified value by utilizing a system of high-performing, independentlyacting safety systems. Said differently, the hazards identified by HAZOP analysis are
mitigated to lower-consequence events (such as plant shutdowns) with high probability
by using safety systems identified through LOPA.

Through these analyses, safety

interlock thresholds are determined. From a reliability perspective, operators seek to
avoid costly shutdowns by adjusting valves when control systems are too slow or
insufficient in responding to severe disturbances (known as special-cause events).
Avoiding shutdowns is also beneficial from a safety perspective, as transient shutdowns
and startups are avoided.
Operators are aided by an alarm structure in which process variables pre-specified
to be important to the reliability and safety of the process are equipped with alarms.
When a variable moves outside of its typical (safe) operating region, the green-belt zone,
either a low (L) or a high (H) alarm activates accordingly. Often, process variables have
several levels of alarms, possibly a yellow belt-zone (bounded by L and H alarms), an
orange belt-zone (bounded by LL and HH alarms), and a red belt-zone (bounded by LLL
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and HHH alarms). Such an alarm scheme is depicted in Figure 4.1. Here, in Figure 4.1a,
a process variable is displayed over months and years, normally residing within its
green-belt zone – and, when perturbed into its yellow-belt zone, safety systems/operator
actions usually return it to its safe green-belt zone. Rare events result in the automatic
shutdown (safety interlock) of the process, followed by a shutdown and restart, which
occur over minutes and hours, as shown in Figure 4.1b. The safety-interlock shutdown is
activated when the process variable resides in the red belt-zone for a pre-specified length
of time,

, typically on the order of seconds to minutes. As a variable moves into

each successive belt-zone, the operator becomes aware that interlock activation is
impending and takes more severe actions to return the variable to its green-belt zone.

shutdown

shutdown

HHH - Threshold

HHH - Threshold

Process Variable

Process Variable

H - Threshold

startup
L - Threshold

shutdown period

LL - Threshold

Δtint

HH - Threshold

HH - Threshold

H - Threshold

L - Threshold

LL - Threshold

LLL - Threshold

LLL - Threshold

Time [months, years]

Time [minutes, hours]

Figure 4.1. Alarm belt-zones and interlock shutdown for a process variable.

The alarm thresholds are set in the process commissioning phase (Hollifield et al.,
2010), with competing objectives to: (1) assure that when an alarm is activated operators
have sufficient time to act, avoiding subsequent (more severe) alarms or interlock
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activations, and (2) that the alarm isn’t a nuisance, often activated unnecessarily, and
often disregarded by operators.

Commissioning is usually performed using expert

knowledge of process behavior (based upon the actions of similar processes and upon
insights gained in the process design phase), and tests to observe typical transient
responses of the variables.
Clearly, alarms are commissioned to alert operators to postulated, more common,
events that could propagate to interlock activation.

But, alarm structures may be

insufficient to alert operators to rare or un-postulated events. Such unforeseen safety
events have the potential to move to the red belt-zone and activate the interlock shutdown
faster than the alarms/safety systems are designed to handle. These events may arise
early involving variables that are not alarmed, or when some combination of variables
leads to such an event. While these events may be easily handled by operators, without
proper alarming, operators may not be able to prevent automatic shutdowns.
A quantitative technique to better identify and understand events that lead to
process shutdowns would be very useful to engineers responsible for commissioning
alarms and operators that respond to those alarms. This paper introduces transition path
sampling (TPS) as such a technique for application in the chemical manufacturing
industries. TPS is a Monte-Carlo sampling strategy that simulates process models as they
propagate toward interlock-activating events. Trajectories of these events are randomly
generated, uncovering many un-postulated events, and enabling postulated events to be
better understood. With many similar trajectories generated, the probability of a typical
trajectory can be estimated, identifying the most likely unsafe events, suggesting more
effective alarm thresholds. TPS has been widely investigated by the molecular dynamics
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community to study rare molecular events (Bolhuis et al., 2002; Dellago et al., 2002), but
the application of TPS to process dynamics for studying rare interlock-activating events
is novel and presents its own challenges.

4.2. Transition Path Sampling

TPS was invented to study rare molecular dynamic trajectories; for example, the
dissociation of a weak acid in an aqueous solution. A weak acid, such as hydrofluoric
acid (HF), dissociates in water in approximately a millisecond, but its dissociation event
occurs in just nanoseconds (Bolhuis et al., 2002). Hence, its initiation time is on the
order of 106 times longer than the event itself!

Clearly, simulation of the

initiation/dissociation sequence involves excess computation time to track the initiation
phase. In TPS, to circumvent this, just one initiation/dissociation event is simulated.
Then, at a random time, , along the event trajectory (spanning [0,

]), state variables are

randomly perturbed (such as atom locations and momenta). This new state is simulated
forward spanning [
, and dissociated at

and backwards spanning [

]. If the acid is associated at

, then a second rare-event trajectory has been generated,

which may be accepted. Over many iterations, numerous rare-event trajectories can be
generated, with minimal computational effort in simulating the initiation phase (Dellago
et al., 2002).
When applied to process dynamics, TPS can identify and explain rare interlockactivating events. The models and time scales in process dynamics are vastly different
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from those in molecular dynamics, but the challenge of simulating rare-events is similar.
A typical rare interlock-activating event may occur over years to decades, while the event
itself occurs over minutes to hours. Similarly, TPS can be used to circumvent simulating
the initiation phase – the time in between rare safety-events of interest. As shown in
Figure 4.2a, a complete trajectory is identified by simulation (or by a rare safety event in
a plant or similar facility elsewhere) and then randomly perturbed, as shown in Figure
4.2b, allowing for the generation of many trajectories. These perturbations are applied to
state variables, often process unit temperatures, compositions, and pressures.

The

perturbations are also applied to stochastic variables – either noise to operational and
design parameters that effect multiple balance equations (parametric noise), or noise
introduced as a term to a single balance equation (non-parametric noise). The parametric
noise can be used to explore rare-events that may arise when operational parameters
(such as product demand rate or feed conditions) fluctuate in a specific pattern. Design
parameters (such as reaction rate constants or binary interaction coefficients) are fixed
over the course of simulations, but perturbations over small ranges can yield rare-event
trajectories. Non-parametric noise, introduced in a well-scaled term added to a process
unit balance equation, can yield physical interactions not in the first-principles model –
such as a side reaction or leak in a vessel. Careful formulation of these terms can
improve the effectiveness of non-parametric noise in predicting plant shutdowns and
accidents.
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Figure 4.2. TPS used to generate a trial rare-event trajectory from an initial
trajectory.

Also, when applying TPS, unlikely rare-event trajectories are often generated easily using
process models. But, careful analysis is helpful in generating initial trajectories that
enable TPS to discover serious unpostulated plant shutdowns and accidents.
The outline of the TPS algorithm is shown in Table 4.1. The random perturbation
of rare-event trajectories may lead to the development of new rare-event trajectories, as
shown by Figure 4.2b. When this new trajectory is accepted further iterations take place
from this trajectory. If the new trajectory is not a rare-event trajectory, or the new
trajectory is an unaccepted rare-event, further iterations take place from the previous
trajectory. The random nature of TPS allows for interesting, possibly unpostulated, rareevent trajectories to be identified.

Additionally, by simulating many trajectories of

postulated interlock-activating events, engineers and operators can gain a more
quantitative understanding of such events.
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Table 4.1. TPS Algorithm
1. Identify an initial safety event trajectory
2. Choose a random time, t', along the trajectory
3. At t', perturb state variables, x, to x’ and stochastic variables, , to
4. Integrate forward from t' to tf, and backwards from t' to 0
5. Determine if this trial trajectory identifies a safety-event
6. If yes, consider accepting the trial safety event trajectory as the new
trajectory, where the trajectory acceptance criteria are defined in Figure 4.5.
7. Return to step 2.

4.2.1. Backward Integration

An important difference between TPS in molecular and process dynamics is the
backward integration approach. In molecular dynamics, force balances,

(4.1)

are solved, which are second-order ordinary differential equations (ODEs), noting that
is the position of atom , and

are the forces exhibited on atom by all other atoms.

At , when backward integration is initiated, the initial conditions are
For backward integration, the sign of the first derivative is reversed, –
stable forward integration to

and

.

, to enable a

. However, in process dynamics, typical systems are

first-order ODEs, taking the form:
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(4.2)

where

is a vector of state variables (e.g., moles or energy),

variables, and

is a vector of stochastic

is a vector of input variables (e.g., feed conditions). The same approach

for backward integration in molecular dynamics is not applicable. If the signs of the
time-derivative terms were reversed:

,

(4.3)

the resulting Jacobian matrices of f, for typical process systems, would have large
positive eigenvalues. Even with linear multi-step integrators (e.g., backward-difference
formulae), numerically unstable solutions would be obtained that are often chaotic.
Because the resulting trajectories are usually inaccurate, a boundary-value optimization is
often formulated, as discussed next.
In one approach, initial conditions in the vector,
integration proceeds along [
state variables at ,

, are manipulated such that when

], the state variables at

,

, approach the desired

. Said differently, the backward-integration step is performed by

solving:
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(4.4)

In this approach, a shooting method (Bock et al., 2000) is used as illustrated in Figure
4.3. Here,

is the initial guess for

substantially less than

. To compensate, a larger guess,

is too large. The next guess value,
to

. After forward integration to

,

is

is chosen, yielding

, yields

which is sufficiently close

. This optimization effectively performs the function of backward integration. When

the initial value lies within the typical operation region, a rare-event trajectory has been
located. If not, this trial trajectory is discarded and a new

and

are chosen from the

previous trajectory.

*

*

2

3

0,2
*

0,3

1

0,1

Figure 4.3. Boundary-value optimization to indirectly perform backward
integration using initial-value shooting.
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In perhaps a more common approach, used herein, the optimization is formulated using
orthogonal collocation on finite elements (Cuthrell et al., 1989). This technique involves
introducing xiK(t), a K-order polynomial approximation of x over the time range,
, with N finite elements spanning the total time range [0, t’]. Each xiK(t) is
constructed using K + 1 interpolations of
spanning

.

, where

is a normalized time

The minimization problem:
(4.5)

is solved for x0. Similar to the shooting method, x0 is the initial condition that places x(t)
close to x’at t = t’. The orthogonal collocation method is summarized in Figure 4.4.
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min [xNK(t’) - x’]2
x0
s.t.
xiK(t) = α0i + α1it + … + αKitK ; i={1,…,N}
0 = dxiK(t)/dt - f(x(t),η(t),u)
x0 = x1K(0)

dxK/dt

t2

ti

t1

t’

ti-1

f(x(ti-1+hiτ1),η(ti-1+hiτ1),u)
Ωi(τ) = α1 + 2α2τ + … + KαKτK-1

dxiK/dt

f(x(ti-1),η(ti-1),u)
τ2

τ1
f(x(ti-1+hiτ2),η(ti-1+hiτ2),u)

τ3

1
f(x(ti-1+hiτ3),η(ti-1+hiτ3),u)

Figure 4.4. Orthogonal collocation over finite-elements.
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τ = [0,1]

4.2.2. Trajectory Likelihood Calculation

Another key difference between the two TPS formulations involves the estimation of
trajectory likelihood in Step 6, Table 4.1. In molecular dynamics, the likelihood of a
trajectory is simply the product of Boltzmann factors corresponding to the atomic
configurations at each time step. In process dynamics, likelihood probabilities rely on
available or simulated process data. The likelihood probability,

, is often calculated

using:

(4.6)

where

, a binary variable, is unity when

conditions (green-belt zone) at

,

lies within normal operation

, a binary variable, is unity when

satisfies the criteria of unsafe or unreliable conditions (red-belt zone) at
the likelihood of the initial conditions,

are the stochastic variables at time

is the likelihood of stochastic variables at time
stochastic samples taken along [
estimated using process data, with

]

8,9

,

.

, and

is
,

is the number of

The likelihood of initial conditions can be

increasing as the population of x0 increases. In

large part, stochastic variables are related to noise (parametric or non-parametric), often
expressed as probability distributions (commonly, normal distributions). In these cases,
are simply the likelihood of noise
with mean 0 and variance,

:
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at time, . When

is a normal distribution

(4.7)

Note that when these likelihood probabilities are very small, they are often expressed on
a log scale.

4.2.3. Full TPS Algorithm

The full TPS algorithm for sampling process safety-events is shown in Figure 4.5,
with the three phases: generating an initial trajectory, generating N unique trajectories,
and grouping the N trajectories into k clusters. The algorithm begins with counters
and

, an initial trajectory, x1(0,…,tf), and its associated likelihood

, calculated

using Eq. (6). At time t’, the x1(t’) trajectory is perturbed using normal distributions to
develop the state x’. The boundary-value problem in Eq. (4) is solved to obtain
is then integrated over [0,tf] to obtain the trial trajectory,
this trajectory,

, which

. The likelihood of

, is calculated using Eq. (6). A random number, r, in the range [0,1] is

sampled; when less than

,the trial trajectory is rejected, otherwise, it is accepted. If
, xi(0,…,tf) =

is accepted, i = i + 1,

is rejected, i = i + 1 and xi(0,…,tf) =
trajectories have been calculated (

, and p = p’. If
.

When N unique

, they are grouped into k = 2 clusters using the

k-means clustering technique (Hartigan et al., 1979).

The Euclidean distance, s, is

calculated between all pairs of centroids (the center of each cluster) and if the distance
92

between the closest pair is greater than 5% of the distance between the furthest pair, k is
increased by one and new centroids are calculated. Eventually, the additional new cluster
will be sufficiently close to an existing cluster, and the loop will be terminated.

Begin

i=1
j=1
Group N
Trajectories into k
Clusters

Generate an initial
trajectory,
xi(0,…,tf)
p = hA(0) ⨯ hB(tf) ⨯ f0(xi(0)) ⨯
Π(g(η(ti)))

k=2

Generate Initial
Trajectory

Generate N
Trajectories
Sample
t’ ~ uniform[0,tf]

Group N trajectories into
k clusters, each cluster
having centroid
Cp,k ; p ϵ {1,…,k}
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, ,

∀
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min (x’ - x*(t’))2
dx*/dt = f(x*,η ,u)
x*(0) = x0

η = η’
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dx*/dt = f(x*,η ,u); x*(0) = x0
Over the range [0,tf]

p = p’

xi(0,…,tf) =
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p’ = hA*(0) ⨯ hB*(tf) ⨯ f0(x0) ⨯
Π(g(η(ti)))
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Figure 4.5. TPS algorithm for calculating trajectories of process safety-events.
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4.3. Exothermic CSTR Example

The TPS algorithm is demonstrated using a familiar example – that of the
exothermic CSTR. With only two differential balance equations, a heat and material
balance, and PI-control, this example has the benefit of being low-dimensional. The
existence of multiple (high- and low-conversion) stable steady-states (Balakotaiah et al.,
1983), and in particular, the infrequent transitions between them, provide an excellent
example of the potential of using TPS to study rare, yet important, safety-events.
Consider a model for the jacketed exothermic CSTR with reaction:

,

(4.8)

a schematic of which is shown in Figure 4.6. The temperature and inlet concentration of
A are

,

, and the outlet temperature and concentration of A,

, are calculated as a

function of time. The reactor is assumed to have perfect level control, with equal inlet
and outlet volumetric flow rates,

. The cooling jacket is assumed to be sufficiently

large such that the temperature change of the cooling fluid,

, is negligible. The reaction

has elementary kinetics and an Arrhenius rate constant; i.e.,

(4.9)
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where

is the intrinsic reaction rate,

energy, and

is the pre-exponential factor,

is the gas constant. The derivatives of

and

is the activation

with respect to time, ,

are:

(4.10a)
(4.10b)

where

is the residence time,

heat transfer,

is the overall heat-transfer coefficient,

is the reactor volume,

is the density,

is the heat capacity, and

the heat of reaction. Typical parameters are listed in Table 4.2.

F, Tf, CA,f

Tc
A→P

Tc

F, T, CA

Figure 4.6. Schematic of the exothermic CSTR.
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is the area for
is

Table 4.2. Parameters for the dynamic CSTR model
Parameter

Value

Unit
m2

A

30

CA,f

2

kmol/m3

Cp

4

kJ/(kg-K)

Ea

1.50E+04

k0

1.7038

R

8.314

Tc

300

K

Tf

300

K

U

100

kJ/(min-K-m2)

V

10

H

2.20E+05

ρ

1,000

τ

0.5

Kc

-0.02

τI

0.05

kJ/kmol
1/min
kJ/(kmol-K)

m3
kJ/kmol
kg/m3
min
min/K
min

This reactor exhibits S-shaped dependences of conversion and temperature on residence
time, as shown in Figure 4.7a,b. Consider that it is desired to operate along the highconversion branch, but at lower temperature, 800K, for safety reasons, with a residence
time of 0.5 minutes, having a conversion of 0.5 and a temperature of 800K.
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Figure 4.7. Conversion in the exothermic CSTR.

It is important to understand the mechanisms by which the CSTR can move from
operation on the high- to the low-conversion branch. From a reliability perspective, this
CSTR would likely be shutdown when it moves to the low-conversion branch, especially
considering that ignition to the high-conversion branch during operation may pose safety
risks (e.g., large overshoot that is difficult to avoid). To move from the high- to lowconversion branch, non-parametric noise is introduced to each of the two balance
equations.

(4.11a)

(4.11b)

Each

is sampled every minute (

with mean 0 and variance,

) from an independent normal distribution

. The non-parametric noise terms in Eq. (11) must be
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scaled carefully to predict plant shutdowns and accidents. Each noise term was scaled to
represent noise in convective flux – the noise introduced to each equation is of the same
order of magnitude as fluctuations in feed material or energy. These terms are scaled to
yield either noise in convective flux or unpostulated safety events arising from
phenomena having similar magnitudes to convective noise; possibly modest sidereactions or water leaks. When
at zero,

(i.e.,

) at all times, with

is sampled from a delta function centered
, the dynamic trajectory over an hour is

shown in Figure 4.8a. However, when the variance is increased to

, the system

moves to its low-conversion region, as shown in Figure 4.8b. These figures motivate
control for the CSTR – a relatively modest noise drives the system to its low-conversion
region, and for very small noise, the temperature still fluctuates over a 50K range. Note
that parametric noise could have been introduced to a parameter appearing in both
balances, such as

, by modifying

, where

is the original choice for

(listed in Table 4.2).
CA,f noise variance = 0.02

CA,f noise
variance
0.2
Caf noise
variance ==.2
1100
1000

T
Temperature
[K]

Temperature [K]

900

time

800
700
600
500
400
300

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6
Ca

1.8

2

Figure 4.8. Effect of introducing noise to an uncontrolled CSTR.
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2.2

2.4

2.6

In typical operation, PI-control is used to maintain the reactor in its high-conversion
region. Herein, the residence time is manipulated to maintain the temperature at 800K:

(4.12a)

(4.12b)
(4.12c)
(4.12d)

where
error, and

is the temperature setpoint,

is the controller gain,

is the integral of the

is the integral time constant, shown in Table 4.2. With control, the noise

term has far less impact, as shown in Figure 4.9.
While control makes moving to the low-conversion region far less likely, it remains a
plausible rare event with safety implications. In other words, even with control, a noise
pattern can move the reactor to its low-conversion region. Using TPS, rare paths from
the high- to the low-conversion regions are shown next.
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Temperature [K]

CA,f noise variance = 0.2

Temperature [K]

CA,f noise variance = 0.02

Figure 4.9. Effect of introducing noise to a controlled CSTR.

4.3.1. TPS to Generate Rare-Event Trajectories

As shown in the TPS algorithm in Table 4.1, an initial rare-event trajectory must
be generated. Such a low-likelihood trajectory can be generated by prescribing the noise,
, to take a high magnitude over the full hour trajectory.
generated by setting

An initial trajectory is

= -1.5 at each sampling interval (one minute), and setting

.

The trajectory begins at steady-state. As the temperature initially decreases, with less
reactant available, the PI-controller increases the residence time, increasing the
conversion of the reaction and generating more heat. The trajectory is shown below in
Figure 4.10. With the system at a low concentration of A and a temperature below the
setpoint (800K), the PI-controller continues to increase the residence time, but the
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reaction heat release is offset by the cooling jacket. Said differently, at the end state of
this trajectory, the PI-controller is incapable of returning the reactor to the desired highconversion region. Subsequently, the region of rare-safety events is initially demarked by
regions in the ranges:

(4.13)

and final conditions bounded by:

(4.14)

time

Figure 4.10. Initial rare-event trajectory.
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From this initial trajectory, the TPS technique generates more trajectories –
specifically, those having higher likelihoods (i.e., less noise).
perturbations are made to the state variables, ,
, and

, and

At random time,

,

, and the stochastic variables;

. These are sampled from normal distributions:
(4.15a)
(4.15b)
(4.15c)
(4.15d)
(4.15e)

Given sampling distributions for the perturbations, the likelihood distributions

and

are needed. A simple, uniform likelihood distribution for the initial conditions
is used, with all trajectories that meet the initial rare-event criteria (Eqs. (12) and (13))
equally likely; i.e.,

⨯

(4.16)

The likelihoods of the noise variables are:

(4.17a)
(4.17b)
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With these distributions established, the TPS methodology iteratively generates many
random rare-event trajectories. In Figure 4.11, a few such trajectories are illustrated.
In the TPS algorithm, the length of the trajectory,
Both

and the sampling interval,

carefully. When

, must be specified a priori.

, for stochastic variables,

and

, must be selected

is too long, trajectories reside in either the high- or low-conversion

regions too long – rather than moving from region-to-region in transition; i.e., along
pathways of interest. Figure 4.12 shows a poor choice for , where the reactor moves too
quickly to the low-conversion region; i.e., low-temperature region. In this case,
set at 24 hr. But, when

was

is too small, the low-conversion region is not reached; i.e., no

rare-event trajectories are computed.
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time

time

time
time

Figure 4.11. Rare-event trajectories generated using TPS.

time

Figure 4.12. Example of a simulation that is too long.
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The stochastic sampling time is especially crucial when control is implemented.
Here, the PI-controller moves toward a steady-state, at its setpoint, in the face of
disturbances. When effective, in response to

and

noise, the reactor equilibrates at

its desired steady-state. But, after equilibration, backward integration cannot be restarted.
Consequently, when responding to stochastic noise, sampling intervals must be smaller
than controlled reactor response times; i.e., when sufficiently small noise sampling
intervals are used, dynamic behavior is achieved. Note that more effective controllers
require shorter noise sampling time intervals. For this example, a sampling time of one
minute is sufficiently short.
The TPS strategy continually yields trajectories having probabilities greater than
or of similar magnitude to the probabilities of the previous trajectory (Step 6 in Table
4.1). The TPS algorithm was run for N = 100,000. The likelihood probabilities, , of the
first 350 unique trajectories are shown in Figure 4.13, in sequence. From the least-likely
initial trajectory, the sampling strategy moves towards more likely trajectories. These
probabilities, of course, remain small as they represent the most likely of rare safetyevents – and the first 150 are rejected as atypical.
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Figure 4.13. First 350 TPS trajectories.

As the trajectories are generated, it is desirable to cluster them to better understand the
transitions between the high- and low-conversion states.
averaged noise,

In Figure 4.14, the time-

, is displayed as a function of the time-averaged noise,

, noting that

each data point represents a single trajectory, with each time-averaged noise:

(4.18)

As shown, there are two distinct clusters of trajectories, A and B, which are identified
using the k-means clustering technique (Hartigan et al., 1979). Here, each trajectory is
clustered about one of the centroids, the centers-of-mass of the clusters. Using this
strategy, two distinct paths to the safety-event have been identified. While other clusters
may not have been identified, these two clusters of likely trajectories are excellent
candidates for protection in the form of reliability and safety systems.
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Figure 4.14. The trajectories displayed in two clusters.

Figure 4.15 shows the natural log of trajectory likelihood for 100,000 unique
trajectories, with values displayed for trajectories 201, 301, 501, …, in sequence. Note:
the first 200 trajectories are atypical and not displayed. Initially, Cluster A is populated,
involving data for approximately 20,000 trajectories, having likelihoods near
. Eventually, the trajectories move towards the bridge between the two clusters,
with those in Cluster B displayed, having likelihoods near

. When the TPS

algorithm samples from within a cluster, it tends to yield trajectories within the cluster.
However, some perturbations allow the algorithm to move from one cluster to the other.
The movements between clusters are possible when sampling occurs from sections close
to the other cluster – permitting transfers to occur with just small perturbations. In fact, a
third Cluster C may exist, which is not populated because it lies too far from Clusters A
and B.
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Figure 4.15. Trajectory likelihood in sequence.

When larger perturbations are allowed, the movement between clusters is more frequent
– occurring across larger distances. Let the variances of the perturbations include a factor

(4.19a)
(4.19b)
(4.19c)
(4.19d)
(4.19e)

When the TPS algorithm is run, starting with the same initial trajectory, the number of
movements between the clusters are shown as a function of
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in Figure 4.16. The greater

the perturbation variance, the more movements between clusters. It should be noted that
even when
discovered).

, only Clusters A and B were populated (i.e., Cluster C was not
But, even larger

computation times.

may yield Cluster C – with significantly longer

Alternatively, starting from a number of very different initial

trajectories may be a fruitful avenue for discovering new trajectory clusters, because with
larger perturbations, the trajectories are less likely to satisfy the rare safety-event criteria
(i.e.,

, or the acceptance criteria. Figure 4.17 shows that as

increases, the probabilities of acceptance decrease significantly. While

allows for

25 movements between Clusters A and B, on the order of 1,000,000 trial trajectories are
generated to capture 100,000 unique trajectories.
Clearly, the number of trial trajectories to yield a new, uncorrelated trajectory is
sensitive to the choice of . While small

yields a high probability of acceptance, as

shown in Figure 4.17, the accepted trajectories are quite similar to the original trajectories
– and many trajectories must be accepted before a new, uncorrelated trajectory is
generated.
The autocorrelation function quantifies the correlation between trajectories
iterations apart.

As follows, a

is determined to locate sufficiently different

trajectories. First, a midpoint for the respective trajectories is selected. For the CSTR
process, within the green-belt and red-belt zones, temperatures and concentrations differ
significantly, whereas in the yellow-belt zone, temperatures and concentrations follow
similar paths. A midpoint is selected at

[(750 + 790)/2] – the temperature

midpoint between the high and low conversion regions (see Eqs. (12, 13)). Note that for
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a trajectory , the

trajectory is similar at its midpoint, the

similar, and so on. As the iteration distance

trajectory is less

increases, the midpoint of trajectory

becomes less similar to the midpoint of trajectory .

The autocorrelation function

averages the correlation between the midpoints of trajectory

and

over all

trajectories (Gelman et al., 2014). The autocorrelation function is:

(4.20)

where
function,

is the autocorrelation value at

iteration distance,

is the concentration of trajectory

at

,

and

is the expected value
are the mean and

variance of the midpoint concentration amongst trajectories in the cluster associated with
iteration i, respectively. A critical iteration distance,

, is defined as the smallest

for

which

(4.21)

noting that the autocorrelation function has the properties:

(4.22)
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Figure 4.18 shows

as a function of

noting that the minimum,

is the most

efficient computational choice.

Figure 4.16. Number of movements between clusters as a function of perturbation
size.

Figure 4.17. Probability of accepting trajectories as a function of perturbation size.
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Figure 4.18.

as a function of .

With the two clusters identified, an opportunity exists to better understand each
cluster. In Figure 4.19, the concentration of A is displayed as a function of temperature
for 1,000 random trajectories associated with Cluster B. All trajectories fit the same
pattern, which can be helpful in creating an alarm. Movement in this pattern suggests
that a reliability or safety-event is impending. Such an alarm could alert operators in time
to prevent such an event. This is a very powerful use for TPS – reliability and safety
systems can be aided by the quantitative simulation analysis to mitigate rare safety events
more frequently.
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Figure 4.19. Concentration of A as function of temperature for all trajectories in
Cluster B.

4.4. Air Separation Unit (ASU) Example

The exothermic CSTR example involves just two state variables in a simple,
familiar model to demonstrate the TPS method and its associated challenges and
opportunities. But, industrial application of TPS is likely to involve significantly more
complex processes. In this example, TPS is applied to an ASU model, having 480 state
variables. This model uses a modified version of a process flow diagram proposed by the
NETL (“Commercial Technologies for Oxygen Production”), and uses mathematical
formulae proposed by Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2009) Because the process operates at
cryogenic conditions, it has many heat recycle loops.
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These loops create complex

process interactions, some of which may propagate to rare safety and reliability events.
The power of TPS is demonstrated in this example – with events that occur due to
process-scale interactions captured and better understood, as compared with events that
arise just due to unit operation disturbances and failures.
Pretreated air (stream 1) is separated into product liquid oxygen (LOX – stream
23), gaseous oxygen (GOX – stream 22), liquid nitrogen (LIN – stream 12), gaseous
nitrogen (GAN – stream 14), and liquid argon (LAR – stream 20). Its pretreatment
involves removing water, carbon dioxide, methane, and cooling to saturated vapor and
saturated liquid feed streams with only oxygen, argon, and nitrogen present (in order of
increasing volatility). In this example, three distillation columns are used – a highpressure column (HPC) at 5.5 bar beneath a low-pressure column (LPC) at 1.25 bar, with
a crude argon column (CAR) taking a sidedraw (stream 18) from the LPC, as shown in
Figure 4.20. At these pressures, the columns operate cryogenically at temperatures on the
order of 85K. The HPC vapor overhead (stream 8) is condensed by vaporizing the LPC
bottoms liquid, and the CAR vapor overhead (stream 18) is condensed by vaporizing the
HPC bottoms liquid (stream 5, cooled to stream 6). As streams leave the HPC and
expand from 5.5 bar to 1.25 bar, they are cooled by GAN (stream 14) and waste nitrogen
(stream 15) to maintain saturated liquids at the same temperature. The HPC and CAR
has 40 trays, and the LPC has 80 trays. The feed and side-draw locations were chosen to
provide products having impurities <1 mol%, as specified in the Huang et al. (Huang et
al., 2009) ASU model.
The trays in each column are modeled at equilibrium using the MESH (mass
balance, phase equilibrium, summation of mole fractions, and heat balance) equations, an
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empirical equation relating the liquid holdup to the liquid flow rate, and the PengRobinson equation of state17. This model is modified from the Huang et al. (Huang et al.,
2009) for model-predictive control. The overall material balance of tray is represented
by:

(4.23)

where

is the liquid molar holdup,

flow rate, and

is the liquid molar flow rate,

is the vapor molar

is the molar feed flow rate (zero for most trays). It should be noted that

only the liquid holdup is considered here – the vapor, being far less dense, has a
negligible holdup. The component material balances describe the composition of each
tray, and are shown in:

∀

where

is the liquid molar fraction,

is the vapor molar fraction, and

(4.24)

is the feed molar

fraction (phase unspecified). The heat balance is:

(25)
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where

is the liquid molar enthalpy,

is the vapor molar enthalpy, and

is the feed

molar enthalpy (phase unspecified). An empirical relationship for the liquid flow rate as
a function of the liquid molar holdup is assumed:

(4.26)
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Figure 4.20. Air Separation Unit process flow diagram.
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where

was specified by Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2009) at 0.5 min-1. The vapor-

liquid equilibrium in each tray is modeled by equating the mixture fugacities of the
species in the vapor and liquid phases:

(4.27)

where

is the liquid fugacity coefficient of species j on tray i, and

is the vapor

fugacity coefficient of species j on tray i, each calculated using the Peng-Robinson
equation of state, at the tray temperature,

, the column pressure, and the mole fractions

of the associated phases. The enthalpies are also calculated using the equation of state as
described by Peng and Robinson (Peng et al., 1976). Lastly, the mole fractions sum to
unity in the vapor on each tray:

(4.28)

The feed air is assumed to have a constant composition (78% nitrogen, 21%
oxygen, 1% argon). Its flow rate, Fair, is determined by the product demand of each
product i, di:

(4.29)
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There are six more operation decision variables, β1 through β6: the LIN split fraction fed
to the subcooler, the LIN split fraction fed to the LPC, the LAR split fraction to the CAR
reflux, the side-draw split fraction of waste nitrogen, the side-draw fraction of crude
argon, and the side-draw fraction of GOX. These decision variables are manipulated
using PID controllers to maintain the six set points, α1 through α6: N2 mole fraction of
GAN, N2 mole fraction of LIN, O2 mole fraction of GOX, O2 mole fraction of LAR, ratio
of GAN to LIN, and ratio of GOX to LOX. Note, the O2 mole fraction of LAR is
controlled, rather than the Ar mole fraction, because a fourth column normally handles
the Ar-N2 separation in industry – not included herein to reduce the computational load.
The set points and α-β pairs are shown in Table 4.3.

4.4.1. TPS Process-Scale Demonstration

To demonstrate TPS, at least one rare-event must be identified. The rare events of
interest for this example involve the nitrogen mole fraction in the LAR stream 20,

.

In this model, the LAR typically contains on the order of 0.001 mole fraction nitrogen.
As its nitrogen content increases, its condensation load increases – with the rich liquid
oxygen stream (6) increasingly vaporized. The effluent liquid oxygen (stream 7), a feed
to the LPC (on tray 30 – typically the largest feed stream), is crucial to the operation of
the column, and as it becomes increasingly vaporized, α3, dGOX, and dLOX may not be met.
Additionally, as more nitrogen is introduced to the LAR, a greater burden is placed on the
column responsible for the N2-Ar separation before the argon product can be sold
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(column not modeled). When the nitrogen fraction in the LAR exceeds a critical level,
the process typically undergoes a shutdown (reliability-event), which has the potential to
become a safety-event (as shutdown and restart can provide more challenges). Therefore,
the rare-event is defined by:
(4.30)

Table 4.3. Control logic of the ASU Model.
Controlled Variable

Manipulated Variable

Set point

α1 (N2 mole fraction of GAN)

β4 (side-draw fraction
of waste nitrogen)
β1 (LIN split fraction
to subcooler)
β5 (side-draw fraction
of crude argon)
β3 (LAR split fraction
to CAR)
β2 (LIN split fraction
to LPC)
β6 (side-draw fraction
of GOX)

0.995

α2 (N2 mole fraction of LIN)
α3 (O2 mole fraction of GOX)
α4 (Ar mole fraction of LAR)
α5 (ratio of GAN to LIN)
α6 (ratio of GOX to LOX)

0.995
0.985
0.99
dGAN/dLIN
dGOX/dLOX

An initial rare-event trajectory begins with little nitrogen in the CAR column –
thus, there is little nitrogen entering the column from the LPC in stream 16. The vapor
mole fraction profile along the LPC is shown in Figure 4.21a at the start of this trajectory
– notice that the argon composition peaks close to tray 39, the tray whose vapor sidedraw
is fed to the CAR column, while the nitrogen fraction is sufficiently low.

At the

beginning of this trajectory, overly aggressive set points (which are described by the set
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point likelihood, described later) for the production rate of LOX and LAR are simulated.
With large amounts of vapor from the bottom of the LPC column, liquid higher in the
column vaporizes to replace it, and the argon bubble begins dropping along the column.
The mole fraction profiles at 1-, 4-, and 12-hr are shown in Figures 4.21b, 4.21c, and
4.21d, respectively. As the nitrogen enters the CAR, it rises into the LAR product, whose
nitrogen mole fraction along the trajectory is shown in Figure 4.21e. This trajectory,
which satisfied the criteria in Eq. (30), represents a rare-event trajectory.
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From this initial trajectory, perturbations are made to each state variable,
, and

.

,

The perturbations to liquid mole fractions are particularly

challenging – in regions where species j mole fractions,

, are near zero or unity, only

small perturbations can be handled (that is, large perturbations may not allow the system
of equations to be solved). However, in regions where
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are near 0.5, much larger

perturbations can be handled. Therefore, the variances of the perturbations are scaled by
factors

(1-

. The stochastic variables in the model are the demand of each product,

di, sampled at each half-hour (with 48 samples over the day-long trajectory).

The

perturbations are sampled from normal distributions with mean and variance in
parentheses:

(4.31a)
(4.31b)
(4.31c)
(4.31d)

The other important user-defined function is the likelihood of each trajectory, p.
The density of initial conditions,
from a 100-day run of the system with

, is calculated using computational data, collected
sampled at 30 minute intervals:

(4.32)

where

are shown in Table 4.4.

A multivariate normal distribution, having 480

dimensions (one for each state variable) is constructed from this data, and is used as

.

Two dimensions (oxygen and argon purity of the LPC sump and CAR condenser,
respectively) of this distribution are shown in Figure 4.22.
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Table 4.4. Product Demand for this Simulated Example.
Demand Load
Product

[kmol/day]

GAN

20,000

LIN

20,000

GOX

10,000

LOX

10,000

LAR

500

Figure 4.22. Initial condition simulated data.

The likelihood of the product demand at each sampling interval is calculated by:
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(4.33)

Having defined all factors in Eq. (6), the likelihoods of the trajectories for this example
are calculated.
With an initial trajectory, a sampling distribution for perturbing the state variables
at t’, and a trajectory likelihood function, the TPS algorithm is run to investigate the rareevent. Because the boundary-value problem and integration of the model equations are
more computationally taxing than for the CSTR example, N is reduced to 5,000. When
this algorithm is executed, the trajectories move into one of two clusters.

Said

differently, two clusters (at least) of trajectories are identified, but trajectories are not
observed to move between the clusters as in the CSTR example. The clusters are shown
in Figure 4.23, with trajectories 50, 100, 150, …, 5,000, displayed. Here, cluster A
contains trajectories that have a high average demand for LOX, whereas Cluster B is
occupied by trajectories having a high average demand for LAR. For the trajectories in
Cluster A, as LOX is withdrawn from the LPC, more N2 is drawn into its lower trays and
the waste nitrogen withdrawn is reduced

Consequently, the crude argon sidedraw

(stream 16) becomes increasingly concentrated in nitrogen, and as nitrogen enters the
CAR column, the rare-event is realized. For the trajectories in Cluster B, a similar effect
occurs where more material from the top of the column (typically N2 rich) is drawn to the
crude argon sidedraw. With more LAR production, the rich liquid stream has a higher
condensing duty, with the rich liquid stream increasingly vaporized, resulting in more
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oxygen leaving through the waste nitrogen stream. Liquid nitrogen, from the LIN reflux,
drops into the middle trays in the LPC to replace liquid oxygen, the crude argon stream
becomes increasingly concentrated with nitrogen, and the rare-event trajectory is realized.

Clearly, rare-events occur when either LOX or LAR contain overdrawn nitrogen.
The two nitrogen accumulations do not occur together in the rare events observed. Also,
as shown in Figure 4.24, the sequence of TPS trajectories does not show movement
between the two clusters in Figure 4.23 as the trajectories are generated.

Figure 4.23. Clusters of rare-event trajectories.
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Figure 4.24. Likelihood of rare-event trajectories in succession.

4.5. Conclusions
While rare molecular dynamics events have been studied using TPS methods, this
paper extends the techniques to apply to process dynamics in the study of rare product
reliability and safety events. For process dynamics, a boundary-value problem is solved
in lieu of performing backwards integration, and the likelihoods of trajectories are
formulated. Two boundary-value solution methods, shooting (Bock et al., 2000) and
orthogonal collocation (Cuthrell et al., 1989), are investigated. While both are sufficient
for the CSTR process, the orthogonal collocation method is much better suited to handle
the larger ASU process model.

Other sampling algorithms, such as forward-flux
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sampling (Escobedo et al., 2009) or milestoning (Kuczera et al., 2009), do not require
backwards integration, and may prove to be effective in understanding rare-event
trajectories as well. The likelihood distributions are formed using simulated data, with
the incorporation of process data to be investigated in the future. For the exothermic
CSTR, two clusters of trajectories are generated by the TPS technique. For an ASU
process model, having far more variables and process interactions, two separate clusters
of trajectories are generated. In both examples, the discovery of two clusters was not
expected – demonstrating that TPS can yield unanticipated rare-event trajectories.
Possibly most interesting is the separation of clusters when applied to the ASU process.
Because the clusters are sufficiently far apart, this indicates that in the operation of this
ASU model, the LOX and LAR demand rate changes can be considered separately. Said
differently, reaching the upper limit of acceptable LOX draw should not influence the
upper limit of acceptable LAR draw.

This sampling strategy benefits from the

randomness in state variable perturbations and trajectory acceptances, allowing clusters
of rare-event trajectories to be better understood and for the potential discovery of
unanticipated trajectories.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work

5.1 Summary
This thesis has presented two methods, the generation of informed prior
distributions (IPD) and transition path sampling (TPS), for predicting the failure
probabilities of rarely activated alarm and safety systems. These are difficult to estimate
using classical statistical approaches. Commonly, an alarm or safety system is activated
just a handful of times, on the order of one to ten, over the lifetime of a process, yielding
confidence intervals too large to allow meaningful design or operational decisions.
Research on dynamic risk analysis, using copulas, reduced the variance of their
predictions (Meel et al., 2006; Pariyani et al., 2012b). However, even using the most
advanced statistical techniques, their variances depend upon the amount of data collected.
Alarm and safety systems are vital to the proper operation of a chemical process, and
meaningful estimates of their failure probabilities are extremely useful, even in the design
and commissioning phase (when few data are available), or over the lifetime of the
process despite relatively few data points where alarm and safety interlock systems
activate.
Chapter 2 describes the IPD technique, which estimates failure probabilities of
alarms rarely activated.

In Chapter 3, operator behavior models are introduced,

enhancing the predictions calculated using IPDs. Large amounts of L- and H-alarm data,
resulting from more frequent, less severe, special-cause events, are systematically applied
to improve the predictions resulting from less frequent, more severe special-cause events.
129

When applied to a SMR process, this methodology is shown to provide more reliable
failure probability estimates.
The second method, TPS, developed initially by the molecular simulation community,
has been modified and applied to study rare process dynamic events. Similar to IPDs, the
probabilities of “trajectories” leading to alarm and safety system failures are estimated.
With this method, many trajectories are calculated using random perturbations, with
statistical weight given to the most likely trajectories. With a fuller understanding of the
trajectories that lead to alarm and safety system activations and failures, using both
methods, operators and plant managers can better protect processes from transitioning
toward unsafe operating conditions.

5.2 A Systematic Approach for Simulation-Based Safety Analysis
While IPDs and TPS can be used individually to improve failure probability
predictions, acting together, they can provide a fuller understanding of rare safety events.
Each method relies on dynamic process models, which can be cumbersome to construct.
Usually, beginning with steady-state models, appropriate dynamic terms are added, then
controllers, and eventually alarm and safety systems, are modeled. Alarm and safety
systems often involve operator decisions – usually involving stochastic modeling. The
construction of these models often requires substantial time and effort.

However,

modeling for various design and control decisions is normally carried out in the chemical
manufacturing industries, so these models are often not built solely for alarm and safety
system analyses. With dynamic process and operator models, IPDs and TPS can be
applied, both during the design and commissioning phases.
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Beyond the dynamic modeling in generating IPDs, TPS provides a framework for
generating more likely paths leading to alarm and safety system actions.

Random

perturbations allow for various trial trajectories to be calculated, and then accepted or
rejected based upon their likelihood. This approach is structured to encourage potentially
un-postulated trajectories to be ‘discovered’. Its results may aid process managers during
the design phase, where HAZOP is performed to assess potential process accidents.
HAZOP analysis focuses on individual process units, the chemical compounds that may
enter the unit, and the possible failures encountered by the unit. Without accounting for
more complex process interactions (such as in material or heat recycle), HAZOP does not
identify the most probable special-cause event trajectories on the process scale. Said
differently, as the fluctuations within a process unit influence all downstream units,
failure probabilities of similar units vary amongst different processes. TPS is well-suited
to quantify the paths leading to special-cause events, possibly terminating with safety
interlock shutdown or an accident. This method has the potential to calculate path
trajectories that are either not postulated during HAZOP analysis, or events determined to
be of far less significance than may be envisioned in the specific process design.
Even when TPS does not uncover un-postulated special-cause events, it often extends our
understanding of postulated events.

TPS helps plant managers identify operational

conditions that render events more dangerous – possibly during a demand rate shift, or in
the presence of another process disturbance. With process interactions leading to specialcause events well understood, the failure of alarm and safety-interlock systems may be
prevented through safer operations that avoid their activation.
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The TPS technique calculates many trajectories of special-cause events, and their
associated probabilities. Using this information, probability distributions of special-cause
events can be constructed. Note that IPDs in Chapters 2 and 3 are generated to estimate
the failure probabilities of alarm and safety systems from particular special-cause events.
The special-cause events, and the distributions of special-cause event magnitudes, can be
quite challenging to quantify. With few such events, few data are available to directly
calculate these distributions. Rather, TPS can be used to generate distributions of the
most probable special-cause events along with their magnitudes, which can be input to
generate the IPDs for the failure probabilities of alarm and safety systems – even those
that involve complex human factors.

The synergy of these two methods is quite

powerful, even with few data (or no data, in the process design phase), permitting the
probabilities of special-cause events and the associated failure probabilities of alarm and
safety systems to be better estimated.
While TPS calculates the trajectory probabilities leading to alarm and safety
system failures, the IPD is better suited for this purpose. The backwards integration
feature required in TPS, accomplished through the solution of a boundary-value problem,
does not permit stochastic operator response times to be modeled. In the simulations to
obtain IPDs, operator response times are calculated upon the activation of alarm
thresholds, with response times a function of the derivatives of variables as they cross
their thresholds, and the number of other active alarms in the process. Other factors were
investigated (the demand rate of the process, reactant feed composition), but did not
correlate well with operator response times.

The factors were used to generate a

distribution of response times from which a response time is sampled and simulated.
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With backwards integration, this approach cannot be taken the response time of the
operator must be purely deterministic.

Therefore, the IPD technique is capable of

accounting for stochastic operator responses, and thus is better suited for estimating
alarm and safety system failure probabilities.

5.3

Future Work

In future work, three areas are worthy of consideration, as discussed briefly in the next
subsections.
5.3.1 Rare-Event Sampling Strategies
TPS was developed by the molecular simulations community as a technique for
studying rare-events. This thesis adapted the technique to handle rare process dynamic
events.

While TPS has provided many exciting opportunities in the molecular

simulations community, other sampling strategies have been developed to handle similar
problems. Three such techniques are forward flux sampling (FFS), milestoning, and
transition interface probabilities (Allen et al., 2009).
The main computational effort when applying TPS to process dynamics is in solving the
boundary-value problem, often accounting for well over 90% of the computation time in
the two examples in Chapter 4. This limitation is circumvented by FFS, which does not
require the calculation of backward-integrated trajectories. The general approach of this
method involves an order parameter, , that spans the two regions of interest from
at the interface to region A and

at the interface to region B. The probability of a

trajectory transitioning from:
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to

;

(5.1)
is calculated for all

in [0,1]. In this manner, the probability of a trajectory spanning

from region A to region B can be calculated. Additionally, the rate of formation of
trajectories is calculated.
This method may provide further insights toward understanding special-cause events in
process dynamics. Trajectories spanning the two regions (from green- to red-belt zones)
are calculated using FFS without solving a boundary-value problem.

Thus, the

computational efficiency of FFS shifts to the efficiency of forward integration. Similar to
TPS, random perturbations are introduced, retaining the potential to discover unpostulated trajectories. Furthermore, in TPS, the event time must be fixed, whereas in
FFS the time length is allowed to vary. This can be important in setting alarm thresholds
that give operators sufficient time to take corrective action.

5.3.2 Operator Decision Modeling
The informed prior distribution technique utilizes operator decision models,
which seek to quantify operator response times as a function of various factors within the
process. These include the state of the process during a special-cause event, which has
significant impact on the operator’s ability to diagnose and appropriately respond to
events. Also, information pertaining to the specific operators describing those that are
most effective and better trusted to handle more challenging tasks (larger demand rate
shifts or operational shifts) is helpful. Furthermore, the time-of-day or time-of-year may
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play a critical role in determining operator’s successes. A better understanding of these
phenomena may influence scheduled shutdown periods or rate shifts at a plant.

5.3.3 Alarm and Safety System Design
This thesis has presented techniques for estimating the failure probabilities of rarely
activated alarm and safety systems in chemical processes.

These estimates permit

engineers and plant managers to install more effective systems. Through the use of
transition path sampling and informed prior distributions, better choices of alarmed
variables, alarm thresholds, operator training, operator decisions, and automatic safety
systems, can be selected. As the dynamic risk analysis community continues to develop
sophisticated methods for understanding the performance of alarm and safety systems,
better operational and design decisions will be implemented (Khan, 2015).
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